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Abstract
Now-a-days, organizations are becoming more and more dependent on their infor-
mation systems due to the availability of high technology environment. Informa-
tion is also treated as vital like other important assets of an organization. Thus, we
require Information Security Services (ISS) protocols to protect this commodity.
In this thesis, investigations have been made to protect information by developing
some ISS protocols.
We proposed a key management protocol, which stores one-way hash of the
password at the server, instead of storing plaintext version of password. Every
host and server agrees upon family of commutative one-way hash functions. Due
to this prevention mechanism, online and oﬄine guessing attacks are defeated.
The protocol provides host authentication. As a result, man-in-the-middle attack
is averted. It also withstands malicious insider attack.
Symmetric and asymmetric are two categories of cryptosystems, which are used
to encrypt messages. Asymmetric cryptosystem for large message encryption in-
curs more computational overhead. Traditionally, asymmetric cryptosystems used
to transfer the shared key, and then the symmetric cryptosystem is used to encrypt
large messages. That’s why, in this thesis, a unique asymmetric cryptosystem for
encrypting large messages has been proposed, which is not only eﬃcient but also
secure as compared to other asymmetric cryptosystems. In consideration to all
the aspect of eﬃciency and computation, our proposed scheme uses elliptic curve
cryptosystem.
Blind Signature Schemes (BSS) facilitate a requester to obtain signature from
a signer on any document, in such a way that the signer can’t know anything
about the message that is being signed. Four BSS have been proposed which are
based on Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). These schemes
utilize the intrinsic advantage of ECDLP in terms of smaller key size and lower
computational overhead to its counterpart public cryptosystems such as RSA and
ElGamal. The correctness, untraceability, blindness and unforgeability properties
of the schemes have been proved. The proposed schemes are implemented and
compared with known BSS. From the comparison, it is found that the proposed
schemes outperform all known previous algorithms based on IFP and DLP.
A remote user authentication scheme is a two-party protocol whereby an au-
thentication server conﬁrms the identity of a remote individual logging on to the
server over a non-trusted and unsecured network. Password based authentication
schemes are commonly used for authenticating remote users. Two unique and
eﬃcient remote user authentication scheme using smart cards based on ECDLP
have been proposed. The proposed schemes do not require veriﬁer table and al-
lows the user to choose their passwords. As the schemes are based on ECDLP,
they require less bit key size and less computation than their counterpart based
on IFP or DLP. Because of these properties, they can be easily implemented in
smart card. They also withstands message replaying attack.
Keywords: Information Security Services, Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm
Problem, Large Message Encryption, Blind Signature, Remote User Authentica-
tion.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
If we look at to the history of Information Security (IS), well back to the World
War II, there was need to secure physical location, hardware and software from
outside threats. Multiple levels of security were proposed and implemented to
protect information and data integrity. Access to sensitive military location was
controlled through use of keys, identity card and facial recognition of authorized
personnel by the security guard. During those earlier years, IS was a straight
forward process, comprising of physical security and simple document classiﬁca-
tion scheme. The primary concern to security was physical theft of equipment,
sabotage or espionage against the product of the system. But with the progress of
Information Technology, the IS issues have become much more complicated and
gone beyond national and geographical boundaries [3, 4].
Over these period, an elaborate set of protocols and mechanisms has been
developed to deal with IS Services (ISS) issues, when information is represented in
electronic medium [5]. Information has not changed dramatically, but the storage
and transmission of information has changed a lot. Thereby, it enables the users
to copy and alter the information very easily, that cannot be distinguished from
the original; sometime creates havoc in business, government and society at large.
The information security services are Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability,
Non-Repudiation, Authentication, etc. [2, 6]. Conﬁdentiality property is achieved
through encryption. As the security of encryption lies mainly in its keys, not only
do they have to be of suﬃcient length, but they also have to be shared securely.
Shared secret keys have to remain secret.
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Asymmetric cryptography was invented to address the drawbacks of symmetric
cryptosystems, i.e., key management. The most obvious application of a public key
encryption system is conﬁdentiality; a user can communicate securely over a public
channel without having to agree upon a shared key beforehand. But due to more
overhead of asymmetric cryptosystems, traditionally, the symmetric cryptosystem
is used to encrypt large messages. Before communicating, the key should be
available at both sender and receiver end. So, to encrypt large messages, we usually
take the help of both symmetric and asymmetric cryptosystems. Using asymmetric
key cryptosystem, the key is exchanged, and the symmetric key cryptosystem is
used to encrypt the large message.
One of the fundamental tool of ISS is the signature [7]. It is the building block
for many services such as non-repudiation [8], authentication, integrity, identiﬁca-
tion etc. In case of non-repudiation, the requester and the service providers can
be prohibited of denying the action made on the transaction made between them.
In this purpose, digital signature scheme is used, which provides a way for signer
to sign document electronically in a secure and eﬃcient manner using his private
key so that, the signatures can later be veriﬁed by anyone else by using public
key of signer. We have studied digital signature and in particular we focus on
variant of digital signature, i.e., the blind digital signature. The blind signature
scheme (BSS) is used in application like Internet voting and Digital Cash, where
the requester needs to get the signature in the message from the signer without
really exposing the message content to the signer.
Password based remote user authentication schemes are used to check the
validity of a login request made by a remote user to gain the access rights on an
authentication server (AS). In these schemes, the AS and the remote user share
a secret, which is often called as password. The remote user uses the password to
create a valid login request to the AS. To provide the access rights to the user, AS
checks the validity of the login request.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Existing literatures are
reviewed in Section 1.1. The motivation for the thesis is formally stated in Section
1.2. Finally, the Section 1.3 outlines the organization of the thesis.
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1.1 Literature Survey
To achieve the issues of ISS, the protocols in following areas are required:
• Key Agreement Protocol— for sharing shared secret key among the sender
and receiver in cryptosystems.
• Encrypting large message using asymmetric cryptosystem which should take
less computation time than the existing asymmetric cryptosystem.
• Digital Signature is the fundamental tool of ISS. Hence, it is required to de-
sign eﬃcient digital signature protocols and in particular BSS for anonymity
of the requester.
• Remote user authentication is used to address the authentication service of
information security system.
The literature survey of above areas are discussed as follows.
1.1.1 Key Management Protocols
Key exchange protocols can be categorized into two party key agreement protocols
(2PKAP) and three party key agreement protocol (3PKAP).
Two Party Key Agreement Protocols
The Diﬃe-Hellman key agreement protocol (also called exponential key agree-
ment) was developed by Diﬃe and Hellman [9] in 1976. The protocol allows two
users to exchange a secret key over an insecure medium without any prior secrets.
A number of commercial products employ this key exchange technique. However,
this protocol does not authenticate the participants engaging in exchanging their
session keys. This gives chance to an adversary to impersonate one of the par-
ticipants. In 2000, Jean-francois Raymond et al. [10] shown that, Diﬃe- Hellman
key agreement protocol implementations have been plagued by serious security
ﬂaws. The attacks can be very subtle. In 2004, Jiang et al. [11] proposed a key
exchange protocol for set-top box (STB) and smart card based on Schnorr’s digital
signature protocol and one-way hash function. However, in 2006, Yoon et al. [12]
4
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shown that protocol proposed by Jiang et al. [11] is vulnerable to an impersonation
attack and does not provide perfect forward secrecy and proposed a new secure
key exchange protocol based on a one-way hash function and Diﬃe-Hellman key
exchange algorithm for secure communication between STB and Smart Card in
Internet Protocol Television broadcasting. Later, Lee et al. [13] proved that Yoon
et al.’s protocol is vulnerable to impersonation attack and can not achieve mutual
authentication. In 2009, Xiumei et al. [14] also shown that protocol proposed by
Yoon et al. [12] is susceptible to password-compromise impersonation attack and
server compromise attack.
Password based protocols for authenticated key exchange was ﬁrst suggested in
1992, by Bellovin et al. [15]. They claimed that their protocols are secure against
active attacks and have the property that the password is protected against online
dictionary attacks. Password based protocol has become quite popular and many
researchers have proposed and applied to many communication systems [16–19].
Some of them only provide heuristic security analysis [15–18,20–26] and some have
been formally proven secure [19, 27–29]. In 2002, Yeh et al. [30] have proposed a
protocol called Simple Authentication Key Agreement Protocol (SAKA) which is
simple and cost eﬀective as compared to previously known protocols. They claim
that their protocol is secure against both passive and active adversaries.
Three Party Key Agreement Protocols
2PKAP is not a particularly useful application, because they require n(n − 1)/2
number of keys. A much more common scenario is that of three-party key agree-
ment [31]. The model for three party key distribution is that two parties having
no shared secret key, enlist the assistance of a mutually trusted third party which
performs the actual key distribution. This trusted third party is frequently re-
ferred to as Authentication Server or Key Distribution Center (KDC). Each of the
two parties is assumed to share a long term key with the AS. As with 2PKAP,
the goal is to design a secure 3PKDP. The conditions for a secure 3PKAP are
essentially similar to that of 2PKAP. The only additional requirement is that a
3PKAP must be secure against a malicious insider, i.e., a legitimate party that,
by participating in legitimate runs of the protocol, can gather enough information
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to impersonate other parties or otherwise abuse the protocol (e.g., a malicious
insider disclosing a key shared with another party).
Steiner et al. (STW) [23] proposed a three party encrypted key exchange
(EKE) protocol. Since this is a three party key agreement protocol, both the
hosts share a secret key only with trusted third party. Ding et al. [20] have proved
that this protocol is vulnerable to undetectable online guessing attacks. Accord-
ing to Chun-Li Lin et al. [26], this protocol is also vulnerable to oﬄine guessing
attacks. An attacker attempts to use a guessed password in an online transaction.
Host veriﬁes the correctness of his guess using responses from server. If his guess
fails he must start a new transaction with server using another guessed password.
A failed guess cannot be detected and logged by server, as server is not able to
depart an honest request from a malicious request. In oﬄine guessing attacks an
attacker guesses a password and veriﬁes his guess oﬄine. No participation of server
is required, so server does not notice the attack. If his guess fails, the attacker
tries again with another password, until he ﬁnds the proper one. Among these
classes of attacks, the oﬄine password guessing attack is the most comfortable
and promising one for an attacker. It is not noticeable and has no communica-
tion cost. Storing a plain text version of the shared password at the server is a
constraint that cannot (or ought not) always be met. In particular, consider the
problem of a user logging in to a computer that does not rely on a secure key
server for authentication. It is inadvisable for most hosts to store passwords in
either plain form or in a reversibly encrypted form. Chun-Li Lin et al. (LSH) [25]
proposed a three party EKE. This protocol is secure against both the oﬄine guess-
ing attack and undetectable online guessing attacks but also satisﬁes the security
properties of perfect forward secrecy. The most important requirement to prevent
undetectable online guessing attacks is to provide authentication of host to server.
In STW, there is no veriﬁable information for server to authenticate host. On the
contrary, if there is any veriﬁable information for server combined with password
will result in oﬄine guessing attacks. LSH uses server public keys for this purpose.
But this is not a satisfactory solution all the times and is impractical for some
environments. Communication parties have to obtain and verify the public key of
the server, a task which puts a high burden on the user. In fact, key distribution
6
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services without public-keys are quite often superior in practice than public key
infrastructure (PKI) [26].
1.1.2 Large Message Encryption Protocols
Symmetric cryptosystems, such as Twoﬁsh [32], Serpent [33], DES [34, 35], AES
[36], Blowﬁsh, CAST5, RC4, TDES, and IDEA [37] use identical cryptographic
keys for both encryption and decryption. In order to ensure secure communications
between everyone in a population of n people a total of n(n−1)/2 keys are needed,
which is the total number of possible communication channels.
To overcome the problem of key management in symmetric cryptosystem, in
1976 Public-key cryptosystem has been invented by Diﬃe and Hellman [9]. Since
then, numerous public-key cryptographic systems have been proposed. Their secu-
rity is based on the diﬃculty of solving a mathematical problem. Over the years,
many of the proposed public-key cryptographic systems have been broken and
many others have been demonstrated to be impractical. Today, only three types
of systems are considered both secure and eﬃcient. Examples of such systems and
the mathematical problems are:
• Integer factorization problem (IFP): RSA [38] and Rabin-Williams [37].
• Discrete logarithm problem (DLP):Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)
[39], the Diﬃe-Hellman key agreement scheme [9], the ElGamal encryp-
tion and signature schemes [40], the Schnorr signature scheme [41], and the
Nyberg-Rueppel signature scheme [42].
• Elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP): the elliptic curve
analog of DSA (ECDSA) [43,44], Diﬃe-Hellman key agreement scheme [45],
the ElGamal encryption and signature schemes [46] and the Nyberg-Rueppel
signature scheme [47].
Besides these, other cryptosystems, e.g., visual cryptography [48], encryption
using genetics and image patterns [49], Water marking for digital rights manage-
ment [50], secure mobile agent communication [51] are also being used in speciﬁc
applications. As per NIST, ECDLP is computationally harder problem than its
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counterparts like DLP, IFP [1]. Figure 1.1 compares the time required to solve an
instance of the ECDLP with the time required to solve instances of the IFP or
DLP for various modulus sizes and using the best general algorithms known [1].
The running time is computed in MIPS years. As a benchmark, it is generally
accepted that 1012 MIPS years represents reasonable security at this time [1].
In Figure 1.1, the time to break RSA and DSA are grouped together because the
best algorithms known for IFP and DLP have approximately the same asymptotic
running times. From Figure 1.1, we see that, to achieve reasonable security, RSA
and DSA should employ 1024-bit modulus; while a 160-bit modulus is suﬃcient
for elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). Moreover, the security gap between the
systems increases dramatically as the moduli sizes increases. For example, 300-bit
ECC is dramatically more secure than 2048-bit RSA or DSA.
Figure 1.1: Comparison of Security Levels [1]
As asymmetric encryptions are more expensive than symmetric encryptions
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such as DES [34,35] and AES [36] in terms of computational cost, generally they
are not directly used to encrypt large messages. Traditionally, if there is a need
to encrypt a large message using an asymmetric cryptosystem, then a symmetric
cryptosystem is used in addition. The message itself is encrypted using the sym-
metric cryptosystem and the symmetric key is encrypted using the asymmetric
cryptosystem. To eliminate this requirement for an additional cryptosystem, in
2002, Hwang et al. [52] proposed a protocol to encrypt the long message using
DLP. Later in 2004, Yuh-Dauh Lyuu et al. [53] in their cryptanalysis proved that
Hawang et al.’s protocol is insecure.
1.1.3 Blind and Digital Signature Schemes
In 1978, Rivest et al. [38] proposed a digital signature protocol based on the
factorization problem of number theory. The formal deﬁnitions of security for
digital signatures were ﬁrst outlined by Goldwasser et al. [54].
An interesting variant on the basic digital signature is the BSS. The concept
of a Blind Digital Signature was introduced by Chaum [55] to enable spender
anonymity in Electronic Cash Systems (ECS).
Any BSS must satisfy the following properties [55–58]:
• Correctness: The correctness of the signature of a message signed through
the signature scheme can be checked by anyone using the signer’s public key.
• Unforgeability: Only the signer can give a valid signature for the associ-
ated message.
• Blindness: The content of the message should be blind to the signer; the
signer of the blind signature does not see the content of the message.
• Untraceability: The signer of the blind signature is unable to link the
message-signature pair even when the signature has been revealed to the
public.
Subsequently, many researchers suggested blind signatures based on IFP, Quad-
ratic Residues (QR), DLP or ECDLP. Based on these schemes, researchers applied
this in Digital Cash [59–62] and e-Voting [63–67]. An IFP blind signature scheme
9
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based on the RSA digital signature scheme was proposed in 1983, by Chaum [68].
Hwang et al. [69] claimed that Chaum’s scheme could not achieve untraceability
and proposed an untraceable blind signature scheme based on the RSA cryptosys-
tem to overcome the shortcoming [70].
A new blind signature scheme based on the RSA cryptosystem was proposed
by Chaum [71] in 1987, which allows an unlimited number of signature types
with only a ﬁxed amount of computation. The scheme is very practical in some
applications such as anonymous payment systems. Solms et al. [72] introduced
the notion of perfect blackmail and money laundering in 1992. Then, Micali
[73] introduced the concept of fair cryptosystems to prevent the misuse of strong
cryptographic systems by criminals in 1993. However, Stadler et al. [74] considered
that the anonymity and untraceability property could still possibly be misused by
criminals. Hence, perfect blackmailing or money laundering would exist in places
like anonymous payment systems. Stadler et al. suggested that a third trusted
party, e.g., a Judge should be considered in the anonymous payment systems, to
prevent such criminal acts. But, Hwang et al. [75] pointed out that the above
blind signature scheme could in fact be traced by the signer. Coron et al. [76]
informed that a signature forgery strategy, which is a branch of the chosen-message
attack, might be introduced into the RSA digital signature system and cause
trouble. Thus, a blind signature scheme was proposed by Fan et al. [56] to enhance
the randomization of Chaum’s blind signature scheme such that attackers cannot
decipher what the signer exactly signs so as to avoid threats from chosen-message
attacks. Unluckily, Hwang et al. pointed out that Fan et al.’s blind signature
scheme could in fact be traced by the signer [77]. Chien et al. [78] proposed a
partially blind signature scheme based on the RSA cryptosystem in 2001, which
could reduce the size of the database and avoid double spending of the ECS.
But, Hwang et al. [79] proved that the scheme of Chien et al. failed to meet the
requirement of untraceability.
Based on QR [37], the following schemes have been proposed. Fan et al. [80]
proposed a blind signature scheme in 1996. The security of the scheme is depen-
dent on the diﬃculty of solving the square roots of QR without trapdoors. Later,
Fan et al. [81] proposed a partially blind signature scheme that could reduce the
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computation load and the size of the database for ECS in 1998. Later, Hwang et
al. [69] proved that the scheme could not meet the requirement of untraceability
that an ideal blind signature scheme should have. In the same year, Fan et al. [82]
also proposed another blind signature scheme to further improve the computa-
tional eﬃciency. Then, Shao [58] claimed that Fan et al.’s blind signature scheme
does not meet the requirement of untraceability and he proposed an improved
user eﬃcient blind signature of similar eﬃciency in 2000. Again, Fan et al. [83]
did not only disagree with Shao’s comments, but also presented a way to forge a
legitimate signature so that the message could be signed by an attacker instead of
the legal signer in Shao’s blind signature scheme in 2001.
Based on DLP, the following schemes have been proposed. In 1994, Camenisch
et al. [84] proposed two blind signature schemes. The ﬁrst scheme was derived
from a variation of DSA [85], and the second scheme was dependent on the Nyberg-
Rueppel signature scheme [42]. Later, Harn [86] showed that, these two schemes
could not achieve the property of untraceability in 1995. But, Horster et al. [87]
claimed that Harn’s cryptanalysis is not correct. When the signer traces the
signature, he will obtain two pairs of signed messages that were satisﬁed by the
equation of Harn’s cryptanalysis. Therefore, the signer cannot trace back to the
owner of the signature. Subsequently, Mohammed et al. [88] proposed a blind
signature scheme based on the ElGamal digital signature scheme in 2000. However,
in 2001, Hwang et al. [89] pointed out that this scheme could not achieve the
property of correctness. When the requester obtained the blind signature from
the signer, he/she could not unblind it to acquire the signature. In 2003, Lee et
al. [90] asserted that Camenisch et al.’s schemes cannot satisfy the untraceability
property of blind signature scheme. Subsequently, Lin-Chuan Wu [91] analyzed
that Lee et al.’s traceability attack is ﬂawed.
With respect to ECDLP, very few works have been done. Zuowen Tan et
al. [92] have suggested digital proxy blind signature schemes based on DLP and
ECDLP.
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1.1.4 Remote User Authentication Protocols
Remote User Authentication scheme allows an authenticated user to access the
remote server for accessing the services oﬀered. Authentication is the key for
information security; if the authentication mechanism is compromised, the rest of
the security measures will be compromised.
In 1981, Lamport [93] introduced the ﬁrst well-known hash-based password
authentication scheme. In his scheme, the AS stores a veriﬁable table at the
server to check the validity of the login request made by the user. However, high
hash overhead and the necessity for password resetting is required. Thus, it is not
practically implementable. In 1995, Haller [94] developed a prototype software
system, the S/KEY™one-time password system, to defend, attacker from obtaining
login id’s and passwords of legitimate users. In 1995, Atkinson et al. [95] developed
Onetime Passwords In Everything (OPIE) at U.S. Naval Research Laboratory
which is an enhancement of Bellcore’s S/KEY™1.0 package. OPIE improves on
S/KEY™in several areas, including FTP service with one-time passwords, and
a stronger algorithm for generating one-time passwords. In 1996, Mitchell et
al. [96] shown that the Lamport scheme is vulnerable to a small n attack. In 1998,
Shimizu et al. [97] proposed a password authentication method called PERM
for application to e-mail forwarding. In 2000, Peyravian et al. [98] proposed a
simple but eﬃcient password authentication system. Their scheme is based on
the collision-resistant hash function, such as SHA-1. Later in 2002, C. C. Lee et
al. [99] shown that, in Peyravian et al. protocol, an attacker can easily obtain a
user’s password by guessing attack and then impersonate the user to login and
access resources in the server. To overcome the vulnerability of their scheme, they
proposed an improved scheme to enhance security of Peyravian et al. scheme.
Again in 2008, Ji-Hye Park et al. [100] proposed secure password-based protocols
for remote user authentication, password change, and session key establishment
over insecure networks, which is an improvement of Peyravian et al. scheme. All
the above protocols have a common feature, i.e., a veriﬁcation password table
should be securely stored in the AS. But, this property is a disadvantage for the
security point of view. If the password table is stolen, removed or modiﬁed by the
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adversary, the AS will be partially or totally broken/ aﬀected. To overcome this
problem, researchers published user authentication protocols which does not use
veriﬁable table. Hence there is no threat of stolen of veriﬁable table.
In 1992, C. C. Chang [101] introduced the remote password authentication
scheme with smart cards. In 1999, Yang et al. [102] proposed a timestamp-based
password authentication scheme using smart card. In his scheme, users are per-
mitted to choose and change their passwords freely and the remote server is not
required to maintain a password table or veriﬁcation table. However, in 2002,
Chan et al. [103] pointed out the forged login attacks to the scheme is possible.
In 2000, Sun et al. [104] proposed an eﬃcient and practical remote user authen-
tication scheme using smart cards. They claim that, their scheme signiﬁcantly
reduces the communication and computation costs. In the same year, Hwang et
al. [105] proposed a scheme which is based on the ElGamal’s public key cryptosys-
tem. Their scheme does not require a system to maintain a password table for
verifying the legitimacy of the login users. Based on simple geometric properties
on the Euclidean plane, Wu [106] proposed an eﬃcient smart card-oriented re-
mote login authentication scheme in 1995. Like other smart card-oriented scheme,
there is no veriﬁcation table for authentication in Wu’s scheme. Furthermore, the
scheme allows a user to freely choose his password and requires much less com-
putation overhead than other schemes. Wu’s scheme is very eﬃcient because it
cleverly exploits the simple geometry property, but it also implicitly left a clue in
the transmission messages. From the eavesdropped messages, Hwang [107] found
that an illegal user can easily forge a valid message. So, the scheme is insecure.
Wu’s scheme shows that if the attacker can derive any geometric clue then, the
attacker can break the system easily. Hwang did not show this key point, and did
not propose his improvement.
Smart card based user authentication protocols overcome the problem of main-
taining the veriﬁable table in case of password based user authentication protocol,
but they require more computation time and more bit key as they use IFP or
DLP. Hence they are not suitable for implementing in Smart Card as they have
less computing power and memory.
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1.2 Motivation of the Thesis
In this thesis, we have developed protocols for solving ﬁve problems which are
encountered in Information Security Services. We describe below the motivation
behind these problems.
1. As it has been mentioned earlier, one of the requirements for Information
Security Services is eﬃcient key management. To address this problem sev-
eral researchers such as Diﬃe and Hellman [9], Raymond et al. [10], Jiang et
al. [11], Yoon et al. [12], and Lee et al. [13] have developed many two party
key agreement protocol. However, a two party key agreement protocol re-
quires n×(n−1)/2 keys, where n is the number of users. So when number of
users becomes large, to manage large number of keys is a complex problem.
To overcome this problem researchers like Steiner et al. [23], Ding et al. [20],
and Chun-Li-Lin et al [25] have developed three party key agreement proto-
cols. However, the work of Steiner et al. [23] suﬀers from undetectable online
guessing attack and oﬄine guessing attack while the work of Chun-Li-Lin et
al. [26] uses expensive public key infrastructure(PKI). Motivated by this,
we propose to develop a protocol which will retain the advantages
of earlier work and avoid attacks like online guessing attack, oﬄine
guessing attack and will not use the expensive PKI.
2. For encryption of large messages, authors such as Schneier et al. [32], Bi-
ham et al. [33], Smid et al. [35] used symmetric key cryptography. It is
well known that symmetric key cryptosystem is computationally faster but
managing secret key is a complex problem. Use of public key cryptosys-
tem achieves a higher level of security and avoids key management at the
cost of more computational time as per researchers like Rivest et al. [38],
ElGamal [40]. Hence, for encrypting large message, the message itself is
encrypted using the symmetric key cryptosystem and the symmetric key is
encrypted using asymmetric key cryptosystem. To eliminate the require-
ment for an additional cryptosystem, Hwang et al. [52] proposed a DLP
based cryptosystem. Later, Lyuu et al. [53] developed an improved version
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of above protocol. Since, size of the keys of elliptic curve cryptosys-
tem is smaller than other public key cryptosystem for a given level
of security, we propose to develop protocols for encrypting large
message using elliptic curve cryptosystem whose security is based
on elliptic curve discrete logarithmic problem.
3. Motivated by the use of Blind Signature in Information Security Services,
such as digital cash, internet voting etc., several researchers developed proto-
col for Blind Signature. As mentioned in the literature survey 1.1.3, authors
like Chaum [55], Sebastiaan et al. [72], Stadler et al. [74], Min-Shiang et
al. [75] developed protocols whose security is based on integer factorization
problem, authors like Fan et al. [80], Shao [58] developed protocols whose
security is based on quadratic residue and authors like Camenisch et al. [84],
Harn [86], Min-Shiang et al. [89], Lee et al. [90] developed protocols whose
security is based on discrete logarithmic problem. Considering the ad-
vantages of elliptic curve cryptosystem over above public key cryp-
tosystem, we propose to develop Blind Signature schemes based
on elliptic curve cryptosystem.
4. Authentication is one of the services of Information Security System. As
discussed in the Section 1.1.4, the remote user authentication problem was
solved by Lamport [93], Mitchell et al. [96], Peyravian et al. [98], Lee et
al. [99] using Hash function and Veriﬁable table. Later, Chang et al. [101],
Yang et al. [102], Chan et al. [103] solved the same problem using Smart-
card and Veriﬁable table. Yang et.al [102] and Hwang et al. [105] proposed
schemes based on security of discrete logarithmic problem thereby eliminat-
ing the work of maintaining the veriﬁable table. Motivated by this, we
propose to develop protocols for remote user authentication using
smart card which are based on security of elliptic curve discrete
logarithmic problem and doesn’t use Veriﬁable table.
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1.3 Thesis Organization
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2- Key Agreement Protocol: In this chapter, a novel three party
key agreement protocol has been proposed, which is based on SAKA. It begins
with the explanation of existing protocols based on 2PKAP and 3PKAP. The
proposed protocol withstands online and oﬄine guessing attacks and does not use
PKI.
Chapter 3- Large Message Encryption: Need of asymmetric protocol is
presented in this chapter. A new protocol for encrypting large message based on
ECDLP has been proposed.
Chapter 4- Digital and Blind Signature Schemes: Four schemes of Blind
Signature based on ECDLP are proposed in this chapter. Computational time has
been the major bottleneck in the existing literature. To overcome this shortcom-
ing, the proposed schemes reduce the computational time by using ECDLP.
Chapter 5- Remote User Authentication Protocols: This chapter starts
with brief description of existing protocol which uses DLP. Two protocols based on
ECDLP which uses smart card have been proposed. These protocols uses ECDLP,
hence they can be easily implemented in Smart card.
Chapter 6- Conclusion and Future Work: This chapter provides the
concluding remarks with a stress on achievements and limitations of the proposed
schemes. The scopes for further research are outlined at the end.
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Chapter 2
Key Agreement Protocol
The primary objective of cryptography is to facilitate secure communication in
an adversary environment. For instance, if two parties, A and B, want to safely
communicate over an active network, they would deﬁnitely want to make sure
that the data they correspond between themselves should remain private and au-
thenticity of the data should be maintained. However, for this, there has to be a
primitive cryptographic key agreement which contains both encryption and digital
signature. With the help of such protocols carrying a common session key, two or
more parties can exchange vital information over an adversely controlled and inse-
cure network. These protected key agreement protocols act as the basic building
block for assembling secure, intricate, higher-level protocols. Key establishment
is generally segregated into key transport and key agreement section.
Secret keys oﬀer message integrity and conﬁdentiality where only trusted par-
ties generally have copies of the secret key. However, in a global world of techno-
logical advancement, key distribution is a major problem from the security aspect.
Basically, key establishment protocols need a set-up phase through which authen-
tic and secret initial keying material is distributed. Most protocols are created
with the objective of distinct keys on each protocol execution. In certain cases,
the initial keying material pre-deﬁnes a ﬁxed key which will result each time the
protocol is implemented by a given pair or even a group of users. These static
keys are insecure under known-key attacks.
There is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between key pre-distribution schemes and dy-
namic key establishment schemes. While key pre-distribution schemes handle pro-
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tocols where initial keying material are the deciding factor to determine the estab-
lished keys, dynamic key establishment schemes oﬀer the convenience of choosing
the established key by a ﬁxed pair or group of users depending upon subsequent
executions. As the session keys are dynamic in the later case, the protocols are
immune to known-key threats. Many session key establishment protocols involve
a trusted party, for both initial system setup and online actions involving real-time
participation. Depending on the role played, this party is referred by a variety of
names like trusted third party, authentication server, trusted server, key transla-
tion center (KTC), key distribution center (KDC), and certiﬁcation authority.
To improve secure key establishment, the ideal way in a key establishment
protocol is to determine the true identity of the sender and receiver which can
be possible by gaining access to the resulting key and restrict any additional
unauthorized parties from extracting the same key. For a secure key establishment,
secrecy of the key and identiﬁcation of accessing parties are required.
Motivation for Use of Session Keys
Key establishment protocols carrying the derived session keys are not secure as
they can be stored in insecure ways, lost, stolen, forgotten or can even copied
without authorization [108]. When a secret key that has been used many times,
it won’t give provide much authenticity about the secrecy of the key, which can
really be a matter of concern. Ideally, the session key should be kept as a secret
for a small time period, i.e., after a single session, all trace of the communication
should be removed [109]. Motivation for ephemeral keys includes the following:
• To limit the existing ciphertext (under a ﬁxed key) for cryptanalytic attack.
• To limit exposure in the event of compromise of session key with respect to
both time as well as quantity of data.
• To evade long-term storage of a large number of distinct secret keys especially
when one terminal communicates with a large number of systems, keys ought
to be created when they are actually required.
• To create independency in applications or communication sessions so that
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there would be a minimum requirement to maintain state information across
sessions.
Challenges in Key Establishment Protocols
To simplify the threats, protocols subjected to an informal model for key establish-
ment, inclusive of underlying assumptions is required. The deﬁnitions and models
can be comprehensive, although attention is limited within two-party protocols.
Communicating parties or entities in key establishment protocols having unique
names are oﬃcially called principals. Along with legitimate parties, the existence
of an unauthorized third party, which are otherwise known as impersonator, in-
truder, adversary, or opponent can also be hypothesized. Encryption algorithms
and digital signature schemes are considered to be secure while examining the
security of protocols. An adversary is not a cryptanalyst attacking the principal
mechanisms directly, but rather one attempts to undermine the protocol objec-
tives by defeating the manner in which such mechanisms are combined against
attacking the protocol itself.
A passive attack involves an opponent trying to defeat a cryptographic tech-
nique by simply recording data like key establishment and subsequently analyzing
it to verify the session key. But an active attack involves a challenger modifying
or injecting messages. As protocol messages are transmitted over an open and
unprotected network, it’s possible for an adversary to insert, alter, delete, redi-
rect, reorder, and reuse past or current messages and thus completely control the
data therein. An active adversary can attack the whole network and even start up
entirely new instances of players. It just needs to acquire session keys and corrupt
players themselves to attack the network. In such circumstances, secure session
key distribution is only possible when A and B have some information advantage
over the invaders. To give emphasis to this, genuine parties are designed in such a
way so as to receive messages exclusively via intervening adversaries through every
communication path, which have the option of either relaying impassive messages
to the intended recipients, or carrying out any of the above actions without any
noticeable delay. Not only this, it is also capable of engaging gullible authorized
parties in new protocol executions.
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An adversary in a key establishment protocol may follow many strategies,
including attempting to:
• Figure out a session key using information gained by eavesdropping.
• Take part covertly in a protocol initiated by one party with another, and
inﬂuence it, e.g., by altering messages so as to be able to deduce the key.
• Commence oﬀ one or more protocol executions (possibly simultaneously),
and combine (interleave) messages from one with another, so as to imper-
sonate as some party or carry out one of the above attacks.
• Without being able to infer the session key itself, mislead a legitimate party
regarding the identity of the party with which it shares a key. A protocol
vulnerable to such an attack is not ﬂexible.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Sections 2.1 discusses 2-party
key agreement protocol. 3-party key agreement protocol is explained in Section
2.2, a three party key agreement protocol based on one-way hash function has
been proposed. in the Section 2.3. Finally, Section 2.4 summarizes results.
2.1 Two Party Key Agreement Protocol
In conventional key distribution protocols, an existing secure two-party authenti-
cation protocol (2PAP) [31] is considered as a stepping stone for building a series
of simple and secure key distribution protocols. The protocols are devised to suit
ideal security necessities, using the security properties of the underlying authenti-
cation protocol. This protocol is modular and simple. The following terminologies
are used:
A,B, P,Q Full principal names
S Trusted Third Party
Ek(X) Encryption of plaintext block X under key K
MACK(X) Message Authentication Code
Kab A and B share Key K
Nab Nonce genrated by A and received by B
A →B M A sends message M to B
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Initial Assumptions
Here it has been assumed that, there exists a secure 2PAP [31]. However, any
secure nonce based 2PAP will be adequate for this purposes. Informally speaking,
a 2PAP is regarded as protected if and only if it is computationally diﬃcult for
an intruder to masquerade as either party. The diﬃculty should be identical to
the strength of the underlying cryptosystem or a strong one-way function. For
instance, if DES is used with the 2PAP, the computational obscurity of defeating
the protocol equals that of breaking DES by brute force, which is normally believed
to require on the order of 256 trials. 2PAP is as given below:
P → Q P,Npq (1)
Q→ P AUTHKpq(Npq, Nqp, Q), Nqp (2)
P → Q ACKKpq(Npq,Nqp, P ) (3)
In two-party key distribution protocol (2PKDP) [31], one of the parties initi-
ates the protocol by requesting a new key. The other party acts in response by
producing a new key and shipping it back to the requester. The protocol may
include a veriﬁcation ﬂow whereby the initiator acknowledges the receipt of the
new key. The 2PKDP is as speciﬁed below:
P → Q P,Npq (1)
Q→ P AUTHKpq(Npq, Nqp, Q)⊕Knew, Nqp (2)
This simple protocol consists of only two messages. This protocol has many
similarities with 2PAP. Q generates Knew (session key) and sends to P . Given a
secure 2PAP, it is computationally diﬃcult for an intruder (not knowing Kpq) to
obtain an AUTH expression when at least one of the nonce Npq or Nqp is selected
by a genuine party. The AUTH expression searched from the secure 2PAP. As
both plaintext and key contain random and unpredictable values, this can be
considered as strong encryption function. It resembles a truncated 2PAP except
that the authentication expression in the second message is used as a one-time
mask for the key being distributed.
22
Chapter2 Key Agreement Protocol
Security Analysis
Key Disclosure— There are two sources of information which can be helpful for
the attacker to break the protocol. In the ﬁrst source, the attacker may record any
number of legitimate executions of 2PKDP between P and Q. In such scenario,
Npq is always under control of P and Nqp is always under control of Q. On the
other hand, he may try to masquerade as P by changing or composing a ﬁrst
message of the protocol and capturing Q’s reply; where Npq will be under the
attacker’s control, and Nqp will be selected by Q. In both cases, at least one of the
nonces— Npq, Nqp, is always under the control of a legitimate party, i.e., P or Q.
Therefore, the ability to compute AUTHKpq(Npq, Nqp, Q) is equivalent to breaking
2PAP.
Key Modification is basically equivalent to key disclosure which is done to a
value known by the attacker. If the attacker is able to change the key to a chosen
value, then the corresponding AUTH expression simultaneously becomes known.
However, the attacker cannot know the key apriori; for that, he has to ﬁrst know
the AUTH expression. That’s why it’s not possible to modify the key values.
Key Reuse involves the attacker feeding an old key to the initiating party. It
might be noted here that it’s not mandatory for the attacker to know the old key
in order to try this attack. The simplest attack is to use pre-recorded replies from
prior 2PKDP runs. Even though the attacker can convince P to accept any value
GX as an expression masking the key, the protocol maintains its strength since
the key extracted from GX remains secret.
Key Independence involves protocol runs to be distinct. Knowledge of a single
session key cannot lead to the discovery of other session keys.
Key Integrity— This protocol does not provide key integrity. Key integrity is
not necessarily considered a primary property of a secure key distribution protocol.
2.1.1 Diﬃe-Hellman Protocol
Two users can exchange a secret key over an insecure medium and without any
prior secrets through this protocol. Today, this key exchange technique is em-
ployed in a number of commercial products. The algorithm itself is limited to the
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exchange of keys. For its eﬀectiveness, Diﬃe-Hellman algorithm depends on the
diﬃculty of computing discrete logarithms. The Protocol is as follows:
Two parties A and B who wish to establish a key agree upon global public
elements.Let be P a large prime number and g a generator over a ﬁnite (Galois)
ﬁeld. Let G be a cyclic group generated by g (primitive root of P ) which is of
order P . Then, every element of G can be expressed as gn, n ∈ [1, p−1], i.e, if g is
a primitive root, powers of g generate all the integers from 1 to p− 1. g (mod P ),
g2 (mod P ), g3 (mod P ), ..., gp−1 (mod P ) are distinct and consist of the integers
from 1 through P −1 in some permutation. We can ﬁnd a unique exponent i such
that b ≡ gi (mod P ) where 0 ≤ i ≤ (P − 1).
The exponent i is referred to as the discrete logarithm, or index of b for the base
g mod P .
Step-1:
A → B YA= gXA mod P .
User A selects a secret XA (private) and XA ≤ P − 1.
User A computes YA= g
XA(mod P ).
A sends YA TO B.
Step-2:
B → A YB= gXB mod P .
User B selects a secret XB (private) and XB ≤ P − 1.
User B computes YB= g
XB(mod P ).
B sends YB TO A.
B computes session key as K = (YA)
XB(mod P )
Step-3:
A computes session key as K = (YB)
XA(mod P )
These two calculations of K produce identical results:
K = Y XAB (mod P )
=(gXB mod P )XA(mod P )
=(gXB)XA(mod P )
=(gXA)XB(mod P )
=(gXA mod P )XB(mod P )
=Y XBA (mod P )
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Attacks on Diﬃe-Hellman
Although useful, the Diﬃe-Hellman protocol is vulnerable to diﬀerent attacks
like [10, 110]:
• Man in the Middle Attack
• Degenerate Message Attack
• Simple Exponents Attack
• Simple Substitution Attack
• Identity Mis-binding Attack
• Subgroup Conﬁnement Attack
2.1.2 Encrypted Key Exchange Protocol
This protocol allows two parties sharing a password to establish a secret key. The
EKE [15] presents a novel and elegant method of key establishment.
Generic EKE
The generic version of EKE is illustrated below:
A→ B A,P (Ea) (1)
B → A P (Ea(K)) (2)
A→ B K(Ca) (3)
B → A K(Ca, Cb) (4)
A→ B K(Cb) (5)
Attacks on Generic EKE
The generic EKE [15] protocol is susceptible to Denning-Sacco Attack (DS) [111].
The attack proceeds as follows:
• The attacker manages to obtain one of the session keys used in one run of a
key distribution protocol. Armed with that knowledge, the attacker is then
able to impersonate one of the parties indeﬁnitely often.
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• The attacker somehow obtains one of the session keys distributed in one
(recorded) run of EKE. Armed with that knowledge, the attacker mounts a
dictionary attack on the password and, upon breaking the password, is able
to impersonate one of the parties for an indeﬁnite period.
2.1.3 SAKA Protocol
SAKA is a two-party key agreement protocol. This protocol is based on Diﬃe-
Hellman key agreement. It is simple and cost eﬀective as it has less computation
cost and can be achieved in less number of steps. Here, Password based mechanism
has been used for user authentication. The Protocol is as follows:
It is implicit that A and B (system principals) are to share the weak secret
(password) pw in a secure way. They agree upon the generator g and its group
Z∗p . x and y are selected in Z
∗
p for a uniform distribution, and X = g
x(modP )
and Y = gy(mod P ) are also in Z∗p for a uniform distribution. The session key is
made by h(gxy mod P ). The protocol run as follows.
1. A → B X ⊕ pw
A chooses a random number x, computes X = gx(modP ), encrypts it with pw
and sends to B. After receiving message of step 1, B recovers X by using the pass-
word pw. Then, B chooses a random number y, computes Y = gy(modP ) and
Key2 = X
y(modP ) = gxy(modP ) like in Diﬃe-Hellman protocol. B encrypts Y
with pw. B also computes one-way hash h() using X, Key2 as parameters. B
sends Y ⊕ pw||h(Key2, X) to A.
2. B → A Y ⊕ pw||h(Key2, X)
After receiving message of step 2, A recovers Y by using the password pw and
computes Key1 = Y
x(modP ) = gxy(modP ). A also computes one-way hash h()
using X,Key1 as parameters and veriﬁes that h(Key1, X) = h(Key2, X). If they
match each other, A conﬁrms that Key2 is valid and both parties possess same key.
It also suggests that X is not tampered in transit and Y is from valid source(B),
i.e., it authenticates B. Then, A computes the response data h(Key1, Y ) and
sends it to B.
3. A → B h(Key1, Y )
B computes h(Key2, Y ) and veriﬁes h(Key1, Y ) = h(Key2, Y ). If they match each
26
Chapter2 Key Agreement Protocol
other, B conﬁrms that Key1 is valid and both parties possess same key. It is also
suggested that Y is not tampered in transit and X is from valid source(A), i.e., it
authenticates A.
Finally, A and B agree on the common session key K = h(Key1) = h(Key2) =
h(gxy mod p).
Security Analysis
SAKA protocol is based on computational Diﬃe-Hellman problem, which states
that computing gxy(modP ) giving gx(modP ) and gy(modP ) is hard. SAKA [30]
also satisﬁes completeness property, i.e., if each party’s messages are faithfully
relayed to one another, then the parties succeed in authentication and key agree-
ment, at least with overwhelming probability. Without knowing the password,
adversaries can not be accepted by the principals. When there are pieces of in-
formation in communications that can be used to verify the correctness of the
guessed passwords, then only oﬄine password guessing attack will be considered
as succeeded. In the SAKA protocol, a passive attacker , all he receives from the
protocol is as follows: X ⊕ pw,Y ⊕ pw,h(Key1, Y ),h(Key2, X). He ﬁrst guesses a
password pw′ and ﬁnds gx
1
= X ⊕ pw⊕ pw′ and gy1 = X ⊕ pw⊕ pw′. If he wants
to verify his guess, he has to ﬁnd Key1 or Key2 which is impossible.
Since x and y are selected in the cyclic group for a uniform distribution, we
can see that X and Y remain on the cyclic group under uniform distribution, and
X ⊕ pw and Y ⊕ pw also remain on the cyclic group under uniform distribution.
There is no way to ﬁnd the relationship between the rejected password and the
remaining password. On-line trial on password cannot partition out the possible
set. The partitioning implies that the possible set decreases logarithmically. If an
adversary tries to masquerade B and defraud A, she can know gx ⊕ pw sent from
A and y, gy, gy ⊕ pw′ by herself where pw′ is a guessed password. It is helpless
since there is not any veriﬁable data. That means, he can not carry out the oﬄine
guessing attacks. To continue, he has to reply h(Key2, X) and it is not possible
since he cannot ﬁnd out Key2.
SAKA oﬀers entity authentication through shared passwords. This protocol
takes minimum number of steps and random numbers and hence can be called as
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optimal 2PKAP. Both the parties encrypt the data using shared secret. It is secure
against dictionary attacks as there is no conﬁrmable information present. It can
be observed from results that one-way hash is not at all useful for cryptanalysis
purpose as it is irreversible.
2.2 3-Party Key Agreement Protocol
Although the properties of the 2PKAP discussed so far appear reassuring, it’s
not a particularly useful application. Three-party key distribution oﬀers much
better common scenario [31]. Here two parties having no shared secret key enlist
the assistance of a mutually trusted third party which performs the actual key
distribution. This trusted third party is commonly referred as AS or KDC. Each
of the two parties is assumed to share a long term key with the AS. The conditions
for a secure 3PKAP are fundamentally similar to that of 2PKAP with the only
exceptional requirement that a 3PKAP must be secure against a malicious insider.
This insider is nothing but a legitimate party which can gather enough information
to impersonate other parties or otherwise abuse the protocol (e.g., a malicious
insider disclosing a key shared with another party).
A naive version of a secure 3PKAP has been illustrated here. It has been
constructed by simply putting together two runs of 2PKAP.
A → S A,B,Nas (1)
S → A AUTHKas(Nas, Nsa, B)⊕Kab, Nsa (2)
B → S B,A,Nbs (3)
S → B AUTHKbs(Nbs, Nsb, A)⊕Kab, Nsb (4)
One notable aspect is that the key being distributed in messages 2 and 4 is
one and the same-Kab. The names of the parties involved are changed to highlight
the diﬀerence with respect to previously discussed two-party protocols. A and B
are the two principals and S is the mutually trusted AS. The only other aspect
where the present protocol diﬀers from 2PKDP is in the way principal names are
used within AUTH tokens. Whereas, before a name signiﬁed the originator of
a token, it now refers to the third party in the protocol, e.g., the AUTH token
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sent from S to A includes B’s name. Similarly, the AUTH token sent from S to
B includes A’s name. This feature is essential to prevent masquerading attacks
whereby a malicious party tampers with the principals’ names in message of step
1 of the protocol. The protocol is secure with respect to outsider attacks, i.e.,
a non-participating party (except A, B or S) cannot subvert the protocol. This
follows directly from the established security of 2PKDP.
Insider Attacks
The new danger introduced in this 3PKAP as a result of using the same key in
messages of steps 2 and 4 are the so called insider attacks by either A or B. Both
A and B, being privy to Kab can discover each other’s AUTH expressions and try
to use this new knowledge in some malicious fashion.
2.2.1 STW Protocol
This protocol was proposed by Steiner, Tsudik and Waidners [23]. Password-
based mechanism allows people to choose their own passwords without any assis-
tant device to generate or store and that’s why it’s an extensively used method
for authentication. However, people are used to choose easy-to-remember pass-
words which prompts easy guessing to be a success. In a 3PKAP, all clients share
their secrets with a trusted server only. This protocol is ideal for large commu-
nication environments. From the form of passwords stored in (B), there are two
types of protocols, plaintext-equivalent protocols in which the clear form of the
A’s password is stored in B, and veriﬁer-based protocols in which the veriﬁer that
is easily computed from the password, yet deriving the password from the veri-
ﬁer is computationally infeasible, is stored in B. The veriﬁer-based protocol has
the advantage that a compromised veriﬁer does not reveal the password directly.
However, a compromised veriﬁer of a weak password can suﬀer from the guessing
attack. In addition, the veriﬁer-based protocol has more computational overheads
than the plaintext-equivalent protocol. Hence, a secure plaintext-equivalent pro-
tocol is an ideal choice especially when we can’t conﬁne people to choose and
remember strong passwords.
From session key creation prospective, such protocols can be classiﬁed into two
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types— key transport protocols where the session key is created by one party and
then securely transmitted to the other party, and key agreement protocols where
both parties contribute information for creating the resultant session key. While
key transport protocol is suitable for some special environments, key agreement
protocols oﬀers better security as none can fully control the session key. In key
transport type of three-party protocols, instead of one of the two communication
parties, the session key is created by the server S. This will result in the worry that
a malicious server can get all transaction contents. In most applications, we only
need the server to be an AS but not to be a monitor center (except some special
needs, like the issue of national defense). In key agreement type of three-party
protocols, the session key contributed from A,B and S needs more computational
cost than it contributed from A and B. Moreover, it is still unknown to the server
S.
Steiner, Tsudik, and Waidner proposed a 3PEKE protocol (STW 3PEKE) [23]
and declared that it performed the following tasks:
• Secure distribution of session key K to A and B.
• Mutual authentication of A and B.
• (Indirect) authentication of S to A and S to B.
Every host shares a secret(password) with trusted third party denoted by P .
They agree upon Diﬃe-Hellman parameters g(generator), p(large prime number).
STW 3PEKE protocol is as given below:
1. A → B [RA ⊕ B]PA
A chooses a random exponent NA, keeps it secret and computes RA=g
NA(modp).
Then, A encrypts [RA⊕B] with his password PA and sends the encrypted message
as a request to B. After receiving A’s request, B also chooses a random exponent
NB, keeps it secret, computes RB=g
NB(modp), then encrypts [RB ⊕ A] with PB.
B forwards A’s request with the encrypted message to S.
2. B → S A, [RA ⊕ B]PA, [RB ⊕A]PB
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S decrypts [RA ⊕ B]PA, [RB ⊕ A]PB with PA and PB respectively and responses
RNSA , R
NS
B to B, in which NS is a random exponent S chose.
3. S → B RNSA , RNSB
B computes the session key K = (RNSA )
NB=gNA.NB .NS(mod p) and sends RNSB with
a key conﬁrmation message [Step1]K to A.
4. B → A RNSB ,[Step1]K
A computes the session key K = (RNSB )
NA=gNA.NB.NS( mod p). A decrypts [Step1]K
with session key K and checks Step-1 equals [RA ⊕ B]PA to conﬁrm that B pos-
sesses the same session key K. A re-encrypts [Step1]K with the session key K and
responses it to B for key conﬁrmation.
5. A → B [[Step1]K ]K
B decrypts [[Step1]K ]K with the session key K and checks [Step1]K to conﬁrm
that A possesses the same session key K.
Undetectable Online Guessing Attacks
For instance, if an attacker attempts to use a guessed password in an online trans-
action, he would verify if the accuracy of his guess using responses of S. If his guess
fails, he must start a new transaction with S using another guessed password. A
failed guess can not be detected and logged by S, as S is not able to make track of
an honest request from that of a malicious one. This can be demonstrated in the
following two scenarios. In these two scenarios, the attacker B, who is valid but
malicious, completes the protocol with S and no participation of A is required.
Scenario 1:
1. B: records [RA ⊕B]PA
The attacker B records [RA ⊕ B]PA of an arbitrary run of the protocol. He
guesses a password PA and computes the value RA. He sets RB=RA and
encrypts RA ⊕ A with his password PB. Then, he sends S the message
A, [RA ⊕ B]PA,[RA ⊕A]PB .
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2. B → S A, [RA ⊕B]PA , [RA ⊕A]PB
S decrypts [RA⊕B]PA , [RA⊕A]PB with PA and PB respectively and responses
RNSA ,R
NS
A to B, in which Ns is a random exponent S chose.
3. S → B RNSA , R
NS
A
The attacker B compares the two values. If RNSA = R
NS
A and so he has
guessed the correct password PA = PA.
Scenario 2:
1. B: [RA ⊕ B]PA
The attacker B guesses a password PA generates on behalf of A a random
exponent NA and computes RA = g
NA( mod P ). Then, B encrypts [RA⊕B]
with the guessed password PA. Additionally, B chooses a random exponent
NB computes RB = g
NB(mod P ) and encrypts [RB ⊕ A] with his password
PB. Then, he sends S the message A,[RA ⊕B]PA ,[RB ⊕A]PB .
2. B → S A, [RA ⊕ B]PA, [RB ⊕ A]PB
S decrypts [RA⊕B]PA, [RB⊕A]PB with PA and PB respectively and responses
RNSA , R
NS
B to B. in which NS is a random exponent S chose.
3. S → B RNSA , RNSB
The attacker B computes the two values (RNSA )
NB and (RNSB )
NA. If they are
equal, it follows that he has guessed the correct password PA = PA.
2.2.2 LSH 3PEKE Protocol
This protocol was proposed by Chun-Li Lin et al. [25]. This protocol is secure
against both oﬄine as well as undetectable online guessing attacks [20]. It also
justiﬁes the security properties of perfect forward secrecy. The most important
prerequisite to prevent undetectable online guessing attacks is to provide authen-
tication of A and B to S (server). In step 2 of the STW 3PEKE, the message
[RA⊕B]PA , [RB⊕A]PB doesn’t contain any veriﬁable information for S to authen-
ticate A and B even though S uses correct passwords to decrypt that message. On
the contrary, if there is any veriﬁable information for S combined with password
PA and PB, it will result in oﬄine guessing attacks. One solution for this problem
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could be through the help of server S’s public key. Assuming that S’s public
key is a cryptographic parameter which is secure against guessing and exhaustive
attacks, and is well-known for all parties. Thus, any veriﬁable information with a
confounder encrypted with S’s public key is able to resist oﬄine guessing attacks.
Based on such idea, a new 3PEKE protocol was proposed which is secure against
both oﬄine guessing attacks and undetectable online guessing attacks [20].
The LSH 3PEKE is described below:
1. A → B A, {ra, RA, PA}Ks
A chooses a confounder ra and a random exponent NA, keeps them secret and
computes RA = g
NA(modP ). Then, A encrypts ra, RA, PA with server’s
public key Ks and sends the encrypted message as a request to B. After
receiving A’s request, B also chooses a confounder rb and a random exponent
NB, keeps them secret, computes RB = g
NB(modP ) then encrypts rb, RB,
PB with server’s public key Ks. B forwards A’s request with the encrypted
message to S.
2. B → S A, {ra, RA, PA}Ks, {rb, RB, PB}Ks
S decrypts {ra, RA, PA}Ks, {rb, RB, PB}Ks with his private key and authen-
ticates A and B by verifying their passwords PA and PB respectively. Then,
S encrypts B, RB with ra, encrypts A,RA with rb and sends them to B.
Notice that the values ra and rb also act as one-time keys.
3. S → B [B,RB]ra, [A,RA]rb
B decrypts [A,RA]rb with rb and authenticates S by verifying the integrity
of ID A. B computes the session key K=RNBA (modP ) and sends [B,RB]ra
with a key-conﬁrmation message [f(Step1), CB]K to A.
4. B → A [B,RB]ra, [f(Step1), CB]K
A decrypts [B,RB]ra with ra and authenticates S by verifying the integrity of
ID B. A computes the session key K=RNAB ( mod P ) decrypts [f(Step1), CB]K
with the session key K and checks whether f(Step1) = f(A, {ra, RA, PA}Ks)
to conﬁrm that B possessed the same session key K. Then, A responses CB
to B for key conﬁrmation.
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5. A → B CB
B checks CB to conﬁrm that A possessed the same session key K.
Public key infrastructure has been used for this protocol through the RSA
algorithm. In the ﬁrst two steps of protocol all data are encrypted using server’s
public key using RSA algorithm. This protocol provides key conﬁrmation also in
last two steps. All data are not vulnerable to dictionary attacks as they have been
encrypted using server’s public key.
2.3 Proposed 3-Party Key Agreement Protocol
Key agreement protocols proposed on password based mechanism are vulnerable
to dictionary attacks. Storing plaintext version of password on server is always not
a viable option always. To withstand all online and oﬄine guessing attacks, a new
3PKAP is proposed, where PKI usage is not required. In this protocol, a trusted
third party KDC has been used which intermediates in key distribution. Here,
one-way hash of the password are stored instead of storing plaintext version of
password. For session key, every host and server agree upon family of commutative
hash functions, using which host can authenticate itself to server. During this
protocol run, host establishes one time key with server using which server also
authenticates the host. Moreover, any public key infrastructure has not been used
which needs large computational power. Since this is a 3PKAP, every host need
not share secret information with every other host.
Before we proceed we deﬁne one-way hash function:
A one-way function is a function f such that for each x in the domain of f , it is easy
to compute f(x), but for essentially all y in the range of f , it is computationally
infeasible to ﬁnd any x such that y = f(x).
The protocol is as described below:
1. A → S A,B,H(PA)[RA]
A chooses a random number ra and generates RA = g
ra(modPP ) like in
Diﬃe-Hellman protocol, where g is a generator of cyclic group and P is
a large prime. It also generates one-way hash of its password H(PA). A
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encrypts RA with H(PA) and sends it to server S along with IDs of par-
ticipating entities. Server stores one-way hash of password of every host
(assumed to be pre distributed), using which it decrypts the above packet
to get RA = g
ra(mod P ).
2. S → A H(PA)(grs1 mod P ), H(PB)(grs2 mod P )
Server chooses random numbers rs1 and rs2. S generates g
rs1(modP ) and
grs2( mod P ) respectively. Using these quantities server establishes ephemeral
keys with A and B respectively. Using this ephemeral keys S authenticates
itself to A and B. S computes these ephemeral keys as speciﬁed below:
KAS = (g
ra)rs1 mod P
KBS = (g
rb)rs2 mod P
Note that KBS can be computed only after fourth step of the protocol.
grs1( mod P ) and grs2( mod P ) are encrypted with H(PA) and H(PB) respec-
tively and dispatched to A. A decrypts this packet with H(PA).
3. A → B FA(PA, KAS) , H(PB)(grs2 mod P ) A decrypts this packet
with H(PA) to get g
rs1(modP ). A establishes ephemeral key with S as
KAS = (g
rs1)ra mod P . A calculates its predicate function FA(PA, KAS)
using which it authenticates itself to server. Since only A knows PA only
it can compute this predicate function. This is a commutative one-way
hash function which is explained in Section 2.3. This value along with
H(PB)(g
rs2 mod P ) is forwarded to B. B decrypts with H(PB) to get
(grs2mod P ).
4. B → S FA(PA, KAS), FB(PB, KBS), H(PB)[RB]
B chooses a random number rb and generates RB = g
rb(modP ). It also
generates one-way hash of its password H(PB). B computes ephemeral key
for authenticating server as KBS = (g
rs2)rb mod P . B calculates its predi-
cate function FB(PB, KBS) using which it authenticates itself to server. This
predicate function is a commutative one-way hash function. Password of B
and ephemeral session key KBS are seeds for this function. Since only B
knows PB, only it can compute this predicate function. After receiving this
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packet, server decrypts with H(PB) to get RB. Server computes ephemeral
one time session key KBS = (g
rb)rs2 mod P . Using this KAS,KBS , server au-
thenticates itself to hosts. KAS,KBS changes with every protocol run. Server
recomputes predicate functions of A and B, i.e., FA(),FB() and authenticates
A and B respectively.
Server need not know PA to compute this predicate function. Since this is a
commutative hash function and H(PA) is pre distributed, using KAS, H(PA)
server can calculate the predicate function FA() and authenticates A. Simi-
larly, using KBS, H(PB) server can calculate the predicate function FB() and
authenticates B.
5. S → B fKAS(RB), fKBS(RA), HKAS(RA, RB), HKBS(RA, RB)
S encrypts RB and RA with KAS and KBS respectively. This defeats identity
mis-binding attacks. f()is a cryptographic transformation function. S com-
putes one-way hash functionHKAS(RA, RB) using KAS(one time key shared
between A and server)using this host-A authenticates the server. Similarly,
S computes one-way hash function HKBS(RA, RB) using KBS (one time key
shared between B and server). Using this, host-B authenticates the server.
fKAS(RB), fKBS(RA), HKAS(RA, RB), HKBS(RA, RB) are sent to B. After re-
ceiving this, B decrypts fKBS(RA) with KBS and gets RA. Since KBS is
shared between server and B, it ensures B that RA value is from authentic
source. B recomputes one-way hash HKBS(RA, RB) using KBS as key and au-
thenticates server. B computes session key with A as KAB = (RA)
rb( mod P )
like in Diﬃe-Hellman protocol.
6. B → A fKAS(RB), HKAS(RA, RB), HKAB(NAB), NAB
B forwards fKAS(RB), HKAS to A. A decrypts fKAS(RB) using KAS to
get RB. Since KAS is shared between server and A, it ensures A that
RB value is from authentic source. A computes session key with B as
KAB = (RB)
ra(modP ) like in Diﬃe-Hellman protocol. B also computes
a one-way hash HKAB(NAB) using KAB and NAB as seeds. Where NAB is
a random number. This one-way hash is used for key conﬁrmation (assures
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that both parties possess same session key). Since NAB is transmitted in
plain there is no need of decryption. One-way hash suﬃces decryption.
7. A → B HKAB(HKAB(NAB))
Using KAB and NAB A recomputes one-way hash HKAB(NAB) and veriﬁes
that B possesses same key, KAB as A. Using KAB A once again calculates
one-way hash HKAB(HKAB(NAB)) and sends to B. After receiving this B
recomputes this one-way hash using KAB and veriﬁes that A possesses same
session key(KAB) as B.
Figure 2.1: Proposed 3-Party Key Agreement Protocol
Commutative One-Way Hash Functions
Both host and server agree upon family of commutative hash functions {H0, H1,
..., Hn}. Let H(P ) be deﬁned as H0(P ), a member of a family of Commuta-
tive one-way hash functions. Host A calculates one way hash of its password as
H0(PA) = P
h0
A (mod P ), where, h0 is a random number(which it keeps as secret).
We assume that one way hash of password H0(P ) of every host is distributed to
server. Since one way hash is irreversible nobody can compute P from H0(P ).
Host A calculates its predicate function FA( ) as :
H0(HKAS(PA)) = (P
KAS
A )
h0(mod P ).
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Server Knows only one way hash of password PA, i.e., H0(PA) using which it cal-
culates predicate function of A as HKAS(H0(PA)).
HKAS(H0(PA)) = (P
h0
A )
KAS(mod P )
Here KAS is one time (ephemeral) key established between server and A. Since
server knows KAS and H0(PA) it can compute this predicate function and authen-
ticate A. Similarly it computes predicate function for B and authenticates B.
Since these are commutative hash functions HKAS(H0(PA)) = H0(HKAS(PA)), i.e.,
(PKASA )
h0(mod P ) = (P h0A )
KAS(mod P ).
Security Analysis
Proposed protocol extends Two party version of SAKA to 3-party protocol. Every
host need not share a secret with every other host. As all the transactions in the
protocol are done using one-way hash of the password, host is not required to store
plaintext version of its password at server, which consequently defeats dictionary
attacks. Since this is a one-way hash function, there is no way to recover P
from H(P ). Every time, host and server establish a one-time (ephemeral) key
using which host authenticates server. Unlike traditional 3PKAP, we need not
use long term or master keys which often lead to malicious insider attacks. In
malicious insider attacks, one of the contributing parties turns aggressive and
misuses the information it has acquired in previous protocol runs and breaks the
system. Through the predicate functions, a server authenticates the hosts. For
calculating predicate functions, server need not know password of hosts. It can be
calculated by using one-way hash of the password of the hosts.
Under some special cases, even though H(P ) is compromised, nobody can
mimic the host to server as only legitimate hosts can calculate predicate functions.
Nobody can mimic the server to the host even if H(P ) is compromised; it’s because
except the host, nobody knows the password which can be a seed for predicate
function. It is equivalent to breaking Diﬃe-Hellman problem. S encrypts RB
and RA with KAS and KBS (one time ephemeral keys) respectively. This defeats
identity mis-binding or masquerading attacks. Here the server acts just like AS
and not as monitoring server. This prevents malicious server from knowing session
key and subsequently knowing all transactions. This protocol also ensures key
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integrity, key non disclosure, and key conﬁrmation. Proposed protocol also ensures
perfect forward key secrecy. Even if one of the session keys are compromised, it
will not lead to disclose of future keys. This protocol sustains online and oﬄine
guessing attacks as there is no veriﬁable information present.
2.4 Results and Discussion
The proposed protocol is simulated with Java using an Intel Core 2 Duo Processor.
It can be observed that the password of host data is stored in encrypted form by
using the one-way hash. Predicate function is calculated using commutative hash
functions using password as seed at client side and one-way hash of the password
at server. Using session key and a random number as seeds the key conﬁrmation
is provided. By including the random numbers, the key space in case of dictionary
attacks will be widened. Encryption of RB and RA using one-time keys provides
user authentication and stops malicious insider attacks. It is compared with well-
known 3PKAP which is given in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Comparative statement among 3-party key agreement protocols
Protocols Strengths/Weaknesses
STW Vulnerable to oﬄine and online guessing attacks.
LHS Uses expensive public key infrastructure.
Proposed Defeats oﬄine and online guessing attacks, dictionary attack,
misbinding attack, etc. and does not use public key infrastructure.
It uses one-time key, commutative hash functions.
Server encrypts RA and RB with KBS and KAS respectively.
In proposed protocol, public key infrastructure is not used. Since this is a
3-party protocol every host need not share a secret with other host. The proto-
col provides host authentication and server authentication as a result man-in-the
middle attacks are averted. It also spoils online and oﬀ-line guessing attacks as
it uses one time keys, commutative hash functions for authentication. Proposed
protocol ensures perfect forward key secrecy, key integrity. The protocol also sus-
tains malicious insider attacks as it uses one time keys for authentication. Server
acts just like AS and not like a monitoring server.
39
Large Message
Encryption Protocol
Chapter 3
Large Message Encryption
Protocol
Cryptography (from Greek words kryptos, meaning hidden, and graphia, meaning
writing) is the science of encrypting and decrypting communications to make them
unitenlligible for all but the intended recipient. Hence, cryptography plays an
important role for achieving information security in communications, computer
systems, electronic commerce, and, more generally, in the emerging information
society.
Throughout the history of cryptography, hundreds of cryptosystems have been
developed. The earliest ones, as well as many later ones, relied on the complete
secrecy in transferring keys between the sender and recipient. These kinds of
systems, called secret key cryptosystem, have just a single key which is used
for both encryption and decryption; therefore, these systems are more frequently
known as symmetric cryptosystems which is shown in Figure 3.1 [2].
The advantages and disadvantages of symmetric cryptosystem are given below:
Advantages
• A symmetric cryptosystem is faster.
• In Symmetric Cryptosystems, encrypted data can be transferred on the link
even if there is a possibility that the data will be intercepted. Since there is
no key transmitted with the data, the chances of data being decrypted are
null.
41
Large Message Encryption Protocol
Figure 3.1: Symmetric Key Cryptosystem [2]
• A symmetric cryptosystem uses password authentication to prove the re-
ceiver’s identity.
• A system only which possesses the secret key can decrypt a message.
Disadvantages
• Symmetric cryptosystems have a problem of key transportation. The secret
key is to be transmitted to the receiving system before the actual message is
to be transmitted. Every means of electronic communication is insecure as
it is impossible to guarantee that no one will be able to tap communication
channels. So the only secure way of exchanging keys would be exchanging
them personally.
• Cannot provide digital signatures that cannot be repudiated.
The problems of key distribution are solved by public key cryptography, the
concept of which was introduced by Whitﬁeld Diﬃe and Martin Hellman in 1976.
The primary beneﬁt of public key cryptography is that it allows people who have
no preexisting security arrangement to exchange messages securely. The need for
sender and receiver to share secret keys via some secure channel is eliminated; all
communications involve only public keys, and no private key is ever transmitted or
shared. In contrast to a symmetric cryptosystem, an asymmetric cryptosystem is
associated with a pair of keys; therefore, not everything related to the cryptosys-
tem needs to be kept secret. This kind of a cryptosystem is also called public-key
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cryptosystem. A public key cryptosystem consists of a public key, which is used
for encryption, and a private key, used for decryption. Therefore, anybody can
encrypt plaintext since the encryption key is available to everyone, but only the
holders of the private key corresponding to the public key used for encryption
can decrypt the ciphertext. Public key cryptosystems are based on mathematical
problem, e.g., IFP, DLP and ECDLP etc. Some examples of public-key cryptosys-
tems are Elgamal, Diﬃe-Hellman and Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) based
on DLP and RSA based on IFP which is shown in Figure 3.2 [2].
Figure 3.2: Asymmetric Key Cryptosystem [2]
The advantages and disadvantages of asymmetric cryptosystem are given be-
low:
Advantages
• In asymmetric or public key, cryptography there is no need for exchanging
keys, thus eliminating the key distribution problem.
• The primary advantage of public-key cryptography is increased security—
the private keys do not ever need to be transmitted or revealed to anyone.
• Can provide digital signatures that can be repudiated.
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Disadvantage
• A disadvantage of using public-key cryptography for encryption is speed—
there are popular secret-key encryption methods which are signiﬁcantly
faster than any currently available public-key encryption method.
By looking at above discussion, to take the advantage of both categories of
cryptosystem, a symmetric cryptosystem is used in addition to an asymmetric
cryptosystem, if there is a need to encrypt a large message. So, traditionally,
message is encrypted using the symmetric cryptosystem and the symmetric key is
encrypted using the asymmetric cryptosystem which is shown in Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3: Asymmetric Key Cryptosystem
To eliminate the requirement for an additional cryptosystem, a novel asym-
metric cryptosystem based on ECDLP has been proposed. With less bit size key,
elliptic curve cryptosystem gives more security and is computationally faster than
the other asymmetric cryptosystems and hence can be used for encrypting large
message based on ECDLP [112–114].
The rest of this chapter is as follows. In the Section 3.1, the basic concept
of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is explained. In Section 3.1.3, discussion on
elliptic curve (EC) cryptosystem based on ElGamal scheme has been illustrated.
The proposed scheme and its security analysis are discussed in section 3.3. Finally,
Section 3.4 presents the results and discussions.
3.1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is a public key cryptography [115]. The use of
ECC was initially suggested by Neal Koblitz [113] and Victor S. Miller [112] and
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there after many researchers have suggested diﬀerent application of Elliptic Curve
Cryptosystems. EC cryptosystems over ﬁnite ﬁelds have some deﬁnite advantages.
One advantage is the much smaller key size as compared to other cryptosystems
like RSA or Diﬃe-Hellman, since (a) only exponential-time attack is known so far if
the curve is carefully chosen [114], and (b) elliptic curve discrete logarithms might
be still intractable even if factoring and multiplicative group discrete logarithms
are broken. Further, ECC is also more computationally eﬃcient than the ﬁrst-
generation public key systems such as RSA or Diﬃe-Hellman [116].
The mathematical operations of ECC is deﬁned over the elliptic curve as,
y2 = x3 + ax + b
where, 4a3 + 27b2 = 0. Each value of a and b gives a diﬀerent elliptic curve. All
the points (x, y) which satisfy the above equation and a point at inﬁnity lies on
the elliptic curve. The public key is a point in the curve and the private key is a
random number. The public key is obtained by multiplying the private key with
the generator point G in the curve. The generator point G, the curve parameters
a and b, together with few more constants constitutes the domain parameter of
ECC. The elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem is deﬁned as follows [2].
Definition: Let E be an elliptic curve over a ﬁnite ﬁeld Fp and let G ∈ E(Fp)
be a point of order n. Given Q ∈ E(Fp), the elliptic curve discrete logarithm
problem is to ﬁnd the integer d ∈ [0, n− 1], such that Q = dG.
In point multiplication, a point P on the elliptic curve is multiplied with a
scalar k using elliptic curve equation to obtain another point Q on the same
elliptic curve, i.e.,
Q = kP
Point multiplication is achieved by two basic elliptic curve operations— point
addition and point doubling. These are explained below.
1. Point Addition
Point addition is the addition of two points J and K on an elliptic curve to obtain
another point L on the same elliptic curve.
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Geometrical Explanation
Consider two points J and K on an elliptic curve as shown in ﬁgure 3.4(a). If
K = −J then, a line drawn through the points J and K will intersect the elliptic
curve at exactly one more point −L. The reﬂection of the point −L with respect
to X-axis gives the point L, which is the result of addition of points J and K, i.e.,
L = J + K
(a) (b)
Figure 3.4: Point Addition (a) J + K = L, (b) J + (−J) = O
If K = −J , the line through this point intersect at a point at inﬁnity O.
Hence, J +(−J) = O. This is shown in ﬁgure 3.4(b). O is the additive identity of
the elliptic curve group. A negative of a point is the reﬂection of that point with
respect to X-axis.
Analytical Explanation
Consider two distinct points J and K such that J = (xJ , yJ) and K = (xK , yK).
Let L = J + K where, L = (xL, yL). Then,
xL = s
2 − xJ − xK
yL = −yJ + s(xJ − xL)
s = (yJ − yK)/(xJ − xK)
(3.1)
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where, s is the slope of the line through J and K. If K = −J , i.e., K = (xJ ,−yJ)
then, J + K = O where, O is the point at inﬁnity. If K = J then, J + K = 2J ;
point doubling equations are used. Also J + K = K + J .
2. Point Doubling
Point doubling is the addition of a point J on the elliptic curve to itself to obtain
another point L on the same elliptic curve.
Geometrical Explanation
To double a point J to get L, i.e., to ﬁnd L = 2J , consider a point J on an elliptic
curve as shown in ﬁgure 3.5(a). If y coordinate of the point J is not zero then, the
tangent line at J will intersect the elliptic curve at exactly one more point −L.
The reﬂection of the point −L with respect to x-axis gives the point L, which is
the result of doubling the point J . Thus, L = 2J .
(a) (b)
Figure 3.5: Point Doubling (a) 2J = L, (b) 2J = O (when yJ = 0)
If y coordinate of the point J is zero then the tangent at this point intersects
at a point at inﬁnity O. Hence, 2J = O when yJ = 0. This is shown in ﬁgure
3.5(b).
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Analytical Explanation
Consider a point J such that J = (xJ , yJ) where, yJ = 0. Let L = 2J where
L = (xL, yL). Then,
xL = s
2 − 2xJ
yL = −yJ + s(xJ − xL)
s = (3(xJ)
2 + a)/(2yJ)
(3.2)
where, s is the tangent at point J and a is one of the parameters chosen with the
elliptic curve. If yJ = 0 then, 2J = O where, O is the point at inﬁnity.
3.1.1 Elliptic Curve over Finite Field
The elliptic curve operations deﬁned above are on real numbers. Operations over
the real numbers are slow and inaccurate due to round-oﬀ error. Cryptographic
operations need to be faster and accurate. To make operations on elliptic curve
accurate and more eﬃcient, ECC is deﬁned over two ﬁnite ﬁelds— prime ﬁeld Fp
and binary ﬁeld Fm2 . The ﬁeld is chosen with ﬁnitely large number of points suited
for cryptographic operations.
EC over Prime Field Fp
The equation of the elliptic curve on a prime ﬁeld Fp is
y2 mod p = (x3 + ax + b) mod p
where, (4a3 + 27b2) mod p = 0. Here, the elements of the ﬁnite ﬁeld are integers
between 0 and p − 1. All the operations such as addition, subtraction, division,
and multiplication involves integers between 0 and p − 1. The prime number p
is chosen such that there is ﬁnitely large number of points on the elliptic curve
to make the cryptosystem secure. Standards for Eﬃcient Cryptography (SEC)
speciﬁes curves with p ranging between 112-521 bits [117, 118]. The algebraic
rules for point addition and point doubling can be adapted for elliptic curves over
Fp.
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Point Addition
Consider two distinct points J and K such that J = (xJ , yJ) and K = (xK , yK).
Let L = J + K where, L = (xL, yL) then,
xL = (s
2 − xJ − xK) mod p
yL = (−yJ + s(xJ − xL)) mod p
s = (yJ − yK)/(xJ − xK) mod p
(3.3)
where, s is the slope of the line through Jand K. If K = −J , i.e., K =
(xJ ,−yJ) mod p then J + K = O where, O is the point at inﬁnity. If K = J
then, J + K = 2J ; point doubling equations are used. Also, J + K = K + J .
Point Subtraction
Consider two distinct points J and K such that J = (xJ , yJ) and K = (xK , yK).
Then, J −K = J + (−K) where, −K = (xk,−yk) mod p.
Point Doubling
Consider a point J such that J = (xJ , yJ) where, yJ = 0. Let L = 2J where,
L = (xL, yL). Then,
xL = (s
2 − 2xJ) mod p
yL = (−yJ + s(xJ − xL)) mod p
s = (3x2J + a)/(2yJ) mod p
(3.4)
where, s is the tangent at point J and a is one of the parameters chosen with the
elliptic curve. If yJ = 0 then, 2J = O where, O is the point at inﬁnity.
EC over Binary Field Fm2
The equation of the elliptic curve on a binary ﬁeld Fm2 is y
2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b,
where, b = 0. Here, the elements of the ﬁnite ﬁeld are integers of length at most
m bits. These numbers can be considered as a binary polynomial of degree m−1.
In binary polynomial, the coeﬃcients can only be 0 or 1. All the operation such as
addition, subtraction, division, and multiplication involves polynomials of degree
m − 1 or lesser. m is chosen such that there is ﬁnitely large number of points
on the elliptic curve to make the cryptosystem secure. SEC speciﬁes curves with
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m ranging between 113-571 bits [118]. The algebraic rules for point addition and
point doubling can be adapted for elliptic curves over Fm2 .
Point Addition
Consider two distinct points J and K such that J = (xJ , yJ) and K = (xK , yK).
Let L = J + K where, L = (xL, yL). Then,
xL = s
2 + s + xJ + xK + a
yL = s(xJ + xL) + xL + yJ
s = (yJ + yK)/(xJ + xK)
(3.5)
where, s is the slope of the line through J and K. If K = −J , i.e., K = (xJ , xJ+yJ)
then, J + K = O where, O is the point at inﬁnity. If K = J then, J + K = 2J ;
point doubling equations are used. Also, J + K = K + J .
Point Subtraction
Consider two distinct points J and K such that J = (xJ , yJ) and K = (xK , yK).
Then, J −K = J + (−K) where, −K = (xk, xk + yk).
Point Doubling
Consider a point J such that J = (xJ , yJ), where xJ = 0. Let L = 2J where
L = (xL, yL). Then,
xL = s
2 + s + a
yL = (xJ)
2 + (s + 1) ∗ xL
s = xJ + yJ/xJ
(3.6)
where, s is the tangent at point J and a is one of the parameters chosen with the
elliptic curve. If xJ = 0 then, 2J = O where, O is the point at inﬁnity.
3.1.2 Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters
Apart from the curve parameters a and b, there are other parameters that must be
agreed by both parties involved in secured and trusted communication using ECC.
These are known as domain parameters. The domain parameters for prime ﬁelds
and binary ﬁelds are described below. Generally, the protocols implementing the
ECC specify the domain parameters to be used.
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Domain parameters for EC over Fp
The domain parameters for Elliptic curve over Fp are p, a, b, G, n and h. p is the
prime number deﬁned for ﬁnite ﬁeld Fp. a and b are the parameters deﬁning the
curve y2 mod p = (x3 + ax + b) mod p. G is the generator point (xG, yG), a point
on the elliptic curve chosen for cryptographic operations. n is the order of the
elliptic curve. The scalar for point multiplication is chosen as a number between
0 and n − 1. h is the cofactor where, h = |E(Fp)|/n. |E(Fp)| is the number of
points on an elliptic curve.
Domain parameters for EC over Fm2
The domain parameters for elliptic curve over Fm2 are m, f(x), a, b, G, n and h. m
is an integer deﬁned for ﬁnite ﬁeld Fm2 . The elements of the ﬁnite ﬁeld F
m
2 are
integers of length at most m bits. f(x) is the irreducible polynomial of degree m
used for elliptic curve operations. a and b are the parameters deﬁning the curve
y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b. G is the generator point (xG, yG), a point on the elliptic
curve chosen for cryptographic operations. n is the order of the elliptic curve. The
scalar for point multiplication is chosen as a number between 0 and n−1. h is the
cofactor where, h = |E(Fm2 )|/n. |E(Fm2 )| is the number of points on an elliptic
curve.
3.1.3 Elgamal-like Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem
In this section, we discuss ECC based on Elgamal. Suppose Alice wishes to send
a message M to Bob. Initially, curve parameters p, a, b, G, n and h are agreed
between Alice and Bob. First, she imbeds the value m onto the elliptic curve E,
i.e., she represents the plaintext M as a point Pm ∈ E. Now she must encrypt
Pm. Let dB denote Bob’s secret key and public key Q = dBG. Alice ﬁrst chooses
a random integer k and sends Bob a pair of points (C1, C2) on E, where
C1 = kG (3.7a)
C2 = Pm + kQ (3.7b)
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To decrypt the cipher text, Bob computes
C2 − dBC1 = Pm + kQ− dBkG
= Pm + kdBG− dBkG
= Pm
3.2 Cryptosystem for Large Message Encryption
based on DLP
In 2002, Hwang et al. (HCH) [52] proposed an ElGamal-like asymmetric cryp-
tosystem that allows a large message to be enciphered eﬃciently.
3.2.1 ElGamal Cryptosystem based on DLP
Let p be a prime, and g be a generator of Zp. The private key x is an integer
between 1 and p− 2. Let y = gx mod p. The public key for ElGamal encryption
is the triplet (p, g, y). If taking discrete logarithms is as diﬃcult as it is widely
believed, releasing y = gx mod p does not reveal x. To encrypt a plaintext M , a
random integer r relatively prime to p − 1 is selected, and the following pair of
values is computed as:
a = gk mod p
b = Myk mod p
The cipher text C consists of the pair (a, b).
The decryption of the ciphertext C = (a, b) in the ElGamal scheme, to retrieve
the plaintext M , is simple as:
M = b/ax mod p
3.2.2 HCH Cryptosystem
Let us assume Alice A wants to send a message M to Bob B. Their scheme works
as follows:
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1. Key Generation: B picks a large prime p and a primitive root g mod p.
He also chooses a random exponent α ∈ Zp and computes β = gα mod p.
B’s public key is (g, p, β) and the secret key is α.
2. Encryption: A breaks message M into n plaintexts M1,M2, ...,Mn, each
|log2P | bits large. Note 0 ≤ Mi < p. A then chooses two random exponents
r1 and r2 with 1 < r1, r2 ≤ p−1 and computes R1, R2, C1, C2, ..., Cn according
as
R1 = g
r1 mod p,
R2 = g
r2 mod p,
Ci = Mi.(β
r1 ⊕ (βr2)2i) mod p.
Above, βr1 and (βr2)2
i
are calculated in modulo p, and ⊕ is the bitwise
exclusive-OR operation. The whole encrypted message is (R1, R2, C1, C2, ..., Cn).
A sends it to B through a public network.
3. Decryption: After receiving (R1, R2, C1, C2, ..., Cn), B reconstructs the
plaintexts Mi as
Mi = Ci.(R
α
1 ⊕ (Rα2 )2i)−1 mod p.
Above, Rα1 and (R
α
2 )
2i are calculated in modulo p.
In 2004, Yuh-Dauh Lyuu et al. [53] in their cryptoanalysis, proved that HCH
is inscure if the number of plaintexts n exceeds the order of 2 modulo q and the
prime modulus p is chosen to be of the form 2eq, where e is a positive integer and
q is a prime.
3.3 Proposed Schemes
Due to more overhead of IFP- and DLP-based cryptosystem for encrypting large
message, two ECDLP-based schemes have been proposed in this section.
3.3.1 Large Message Encryption Scheme 1 (LMES1)
This proposed scheme is based on both the Diﬃe-Hellman distribution scheme
and ElGamal cryptosystem. The Diﬃe-Hellman key distribution scheme is used
to generate the key pair of public and secret keys for all users ui for i = 1, 2, ..., n.
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Each user ui randomly selects secret key di and computes the corresponding public
key Qi = diP .
In this scheme, let Bob and Alice want to deliver a conﬁdential large message
M as per the following algorithm:
Initially, Bob breaks the plaintext M(Mx,My) into t pieces M1,M2, ...,Mt of length
being 512 bits and convert them into points in EC.
Key Generation (Alice):
1. Select a random integer d from [1, n− 1].
2. Compute Q = dP .
3. A’s public key is Q and private key is d.
Encryption (Bob):
1. Select two random numbers (r1, r2) ∈ [1, n− 1].
2. Compute B1 and B2 as follows:
B1 = r1P (3.8a)
B2 = r2P (3.8b)
such that
SAB1 = r1Q = r1dP = (xs1, ys1)
SAB2 = r2Q = r2dP = (xs2, ys2)
3. if xs1 = 0 mod P and xs2 = 0 mod P then go to step 2.
4. Compute Cxj and Cyj, j = 1, 2, ..., t as follows:
Cxj = Mxj ∗ (xs1 ⊕ x2js2) mod n (3.9a)
Cyj = Myj ∗ (ys1 ⊕ y2js2) mod n (3.9b)
5. Send (B1, B2, Cxj, Cyj), j = 1, 2, ..., t to Alice.
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Decryption (Alice):
1. Alice receives (B1, B2, Cxj, Cyj), j = 1, 2, ..., t and does the following to get
M = (Mx,My).
2. Compute SAB1 and SAB1 as follows:
SAB1 = dB1 = dr1P = (xs1, ys1)
SAB2 = dB2 = dr2P = (xs2, ys2)
3. Compute Mxj and Myj as follows:
Mxj = Cxj ∗ (xs1 ⊕ x2js2)−1 mod n
Myj = Cyj ∗ (ys1 ⊕ y2js2)−1 mod n
4. Find Message Mj = (Mxj,Myj).
As per this proposed algorithm, the sender is required to select two random
numbers r1 and r2. In comparison to 2t times in ElGamal-like ECC, this scheme
needs four and two times scalar point multiplication for encryption and decryption
respectively. However, for multiplication operation, it is same in both the cases.
In case of the proposed scheme, it requires additional 4t EX-OR operations. While
encrypting large messages, this proposed scheme is computationally faster as com-
pared to ElGamal based EC cryptosystem, because the computational complexity
depends on elliptic scalar point multiplication.
3.3.2 Large Message Encryption Scheme 2 (LMES2)
This scheme is based on both the Diﬃe-Hellman distribution scheme and ElGa-
mal cryptosystem as before. Here, let Bob and Alice want to deliver a conﬁdential
large message M as per the following algorithm:
Initially, Bob breaks the plaintext M(Mx,My) into t pieces M1,M2, ...,Mt of length
being 512 bits and convert them into points in EC.
Key Generation (Alice):
1. Select a random integer d from [1, n− 1].
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2. Compute Q = dP .
3. Alice’s public key is Q and private key is d.
Encryption (Bob):
1. Select a random number r ∈ [1, n− 1].
2. Compute K as follows:
K = rP (3.10)
such that
SAB = rQ = rdP = (xs, ys)
3. Compute Cxj and Cyj, j = 1, 2, ..., t as follows:
Cxj = Mxj.(xs + H(xs, j)) mod n (3.11a)
Cyj = Myj .(ys + H(ys, j)) mod n (3.11b)
where H() : 0, 1∗ → Zp is a cryptographic hash function.
4. Send (K,Cxj, Cyj), j = 1, 2, ..., t to Alice.
Decryption (Alice):
1. Alice receives (K,Cxj, Cyj), j = 1, 2, ..., t and does the following to get M =
(Mx,My).
2. Compute SAB as follows:
SAB = dK = drP = (xs, ys)
3. Compute Mxj and Myj as follows:
Mxj = Cxj/(xs + H(xs, j)) mod n
Myj = Cyj/(ys + H(ys, j)) mod n
4. Find Message Mj = (Mxj,Myj).
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3.3.3 Security Analysis of LMES1 and LMES2
Large Message Encryption Scheme 1
If an intruder knows some pairs of the plaintext and ciphertext (Mxj , Cxj) and
(Myj , Cyj), the intruder can obtain (xs1⊕x2js2) and (ys1⊕y2js2) by solving equations
3.9a and 3.9b. However, it is diﬃcult for intruder to obtain xs1, xs2, ys1, ys2, x
2j
s2
and y2js2 from (xs1 ⊕ x2js2) mod n and (ys1 ⊕ y2js2) mod n. Since (xs1 ⊕ x2js2) and
(ys1 ⊕ y2js2) are nonlinear, an illegal user can’t acquire the pieces of plaintext even
though he/she can ﬁnd some (Mxj, Cxj) and (Myj , Cyj) by solving 3.9a and 3.9b.
Hence the proposed scheme is secure against a chosen plaintext attacks.
Large Message Encryption Scheme 2
In this scheme, for an adversary it is infeasible to compute either d or r from SAB.
Suppose, the adversary knows t− 1 parts of the plaintext message: Mx1, ..,Mxi−1,
Mxi+1, ...,Mxt and My1, ..,Myi−1, Myi+1, ...,Myt. Then, the adversary can only
derive xs + H(xs, j) = Cxj/Myj for j = i, but this doesn’t allow the adversary to
compute xs +H(xs, i) and ys +H(ys, i). Hence, the adversary still can’t compute
M .
3.4 Results and Discussion
The proposed schemes have been implemented using Java Card Toolkit 2-1-2 and
tested in Java Card simulator— jcwde (Java Card Workstation Development En-
vironment) and the encryption time comparison between LMES1, LMES2 and
ElGamal-like ECC is shown in Figure 3.6. It is seen from Figure 3.6 that the rate
of growth of computing time against message size of LMES1 and LMES2 are much
less than the ElGamal-like ECC. Also, it is observed that LMES2 is faster than
that of LMES1.
The number of operations used in diﬀerent schemes are compared and shown
in Table 3.1.
It can be observed from Table 3.1 that the number of scalar point multiplica-
tion operations in LMES1 and LMES2 are less than that of ElGamal like-ECC.
Other operations used in LMES1 and LMES2 are least signiﬁcant than that of
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Figure 3.6: Encryption Times of ElGamal-like ECC, LMES1, and LMES2
scalar point multiplication operations.Because of this, LMES1 and LMES2 are
computationally faster than ElGamal like-ECC.
Table 3.1: Comparison among ElGamal-like ECC, LMES1, and LMES2
Schemes Encryption Decryption
ElGamal-ECC t scalar point multiplications t scalar point multiplications
LMES1 4 scalar point multiplications 2 scalar point multiplications
2t EX-OR operations 2t EX-OR operations
2t modular multiplications 2t modular divisions
2 random number generations
LMES2 2 scalar point multiplications 1 scalar point multiplication
2t modular multiplications 2t modular divisions
2t hash operations 2t hash operations
1 random number generations
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Chapter 4
Digital and Blind Signature
Schemes
Establishing a framework for the authentication of computer-based information
in today’s commercial era requires awareness with concepts and specialized skills
from computer security ﬁelds. A digital signature scheme oﬀers a technique for
Signer to sign document electronically in a secure and eﬃcient manner using his
private key so that the signatures can later be veriﬁed by anyone else by using
public key of Signer. In this way, it will be diﬃcult to forge the signatures. In
order to ensure the security and authenticity of the documents, the Information
Technology Act, 2000 of India provides rules for the use of Digital Signatures on
the documents submitted in electronic form. The idea of public key cryptosystem
was ﬁrst deﬁned in the path-breaking paper of Diﬃe and Hellman, and later digital
signature algorithm (DSA) based on a number theoretic assumption was given by
Rivest, Shamir and Adleman [38]. Digital signature’s formal deﬁnition was ﬁrst
outlined by Goldwasser, Micali, and Rivest [54].
Following are some common reasons for applying a digital signature to com-
munications.
• Signer Authentication: If a public and private key pair is associated
with an identiﬁed Signer, the digital signature attributes the message to
the Signer. The digital signature cannot be forged unless the Signer loses
control of the private key (compromise of the private key), e.g., by means of
revealing it or losing the media or device in which it is contained.
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• Message Authentication: The digital signature also identiﬁes the signed
message, generally with a much greater certainty and precision than paper
signatures. Veriﬁcation reveals any tampering, since the comparison of the
hash results (one made at signing and the other made at verifying) shows
whether the message is the same as when signed.
• Aﬃrmative Act: Creating a digital signature requires the Signer to use
the Signer’s private key. This act can perform the ceremonial function of
alerting the Signer to the fact that the Signer is consummating a transaction
with legal consequences.
• Eﬃciency: The processes of creating and verifying a digital signature pro-
vide a high level of assurance that the digital signature is genuinely the
Signer’s. As for modern electronic data interchange (EDI), the creation and
veriﬁcation processes are capable of being completely automatic (sometimes
referred to as machinable), and the human interaction is required in an ex-
ception case only. Compared to paper methods such as checking specimen
signature cards— methods so tedious and labor-intensive that they are ac-
tually, rarely used in practice. Digital signatures yield a high degree of
assurance without adding greatly to the resources required for processing.
An interesting variant of the basic digital signature scheme (DSS) is the blind
digital signature. The concept of a blind signature scheme (BSS) was introduced
by Chaum [55] to enable spender anonymity in ECS. This procedure can be well
explained with an example taken from the familiar world of paper documents. The
paper analog of a blind signature can be implemented with carbon paper lined
envelopes. Putting a signature on the outside of such an envelope leaves a carbon
copy of the signature on a slip of paper within the envelope. Such signatures
require that a Signer be able to sign a document without knowing its contents.
Moreover, in case the Signer see the document/signature pair, still then one will
not be able to determine when or for whom it has been signed (but the veriﬁcation
of the signature can be made). This intuitively refers to signing a document with
your eyes closed. Even if you see the document and signature later on, you can
verify that the signature, but you will probably have great diﬃculty in recollecting
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when or for whom you signed the original document. At ﬁrst this concept seems a
little strange (why would you want to sign something without seeing it?). It turns
out that, when applied properly, this notion has some very nice applications in
situations where anonymity is a big issue. Two such applications are online voting
and electronic cash. When you submit an online vote, you might like for that vote
to be anonymous so no one can tell whom you voted for. Similarly with electronic
cash, you might not want someone else to know who you are when you spend it.
This is similar to normal paper cash when you make a purchase, the vendor more
or less has no idea who you are, but he can probably tell whether the money you
gave him is legitimate. Speciﬁcally, in this electronic cash scenario, a document
corresponds to an electronic coin or note, and signed it.
In this chapter, Section 4.1 describes a high-level picture of the Digital Signa-
ture and Blind Signature based on RSA public key cryptosystem. In Section 4.2,
application of Blind Signatures are explained. In Section 4.3, proposed BSS have
been explained. Properties of proposed BSS like correctness blindness, untraca-
bility and unforgebility have been discussed in Section 4.4. Finally, results and
discussion of proposed BSS are done in Section 4.5.
4.1 Signature Schemes Based on RSA
The digital and blinds signature schemes based on RSA public key cryptosystem
are explained below.
4.1.1 Digital Signature
A digital signature scheme (DSS) typically consists of three algorithms:
• A key generation algorithm that selects a private key uniformly at random
from a set of possible private keys. The algorithm outputs the private key
and a corresponding public key.
• A signing algorithm which, given a message and a private key, produces a
signature.
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• A signature verifying algorithm which given a message, public key and a
signature, either accepts or rejects.
Key Generation Algorithm
Let n = pq where p and q are two large primes and let e be chosen such that
GCD(φ(n), e) = 1, (1 < e < φ(n)). Moreover, let d be such that de = 1 mod
φ(n). We assume that the Signer’s public key is (n, e) and the private key is
(p, q, d). It is proved that obtaining a private key from the public key is very
diﬃcult unless you know the factorization of n [38].
Signing Algorithm
The signature can be computed easily by a Signer who knows the message and
secret key d as follows:
s = md mod n (4.1)
Verifying Algorithm
It is easy to verify that (m, s) is valid by checking if the following equality holds:
m = se mod n (4.2)
where equality follows because de = 1 mod φ(n). Now we will discuss the Chaum’s
Blind Signature.
4.1.2 Blind Signature
Key Generation and parameters are same as Digital Signature. Let a Requester
sends a message M ∈ [0, n− 1] to be signed by a Signer using Chaum’s BSS. The
diﬀerent phases are explained below in brief.
Blinding Phase
The Requester picks a blinding factor r, which is a random integer between 0 and
n, and computes the value:
m′ = mre mod n (4.3)
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The Requester sends m′ to the Signer. m′ is the message to be signed by the
Signer as in case of general signature without knowing the original message m.
Signing Phase
The Signer signs the message m′ using his/her private key d as below:
s′ = (m′)d mod n (4.4)
The Signer returns s′ to the Requester as the blind signature.
Extraction Phase
The Requester after receiving the s′, he/she extracts the signature s as follows:
s = s′/r mod n
= (m′)d/r mod n
= (mre)d/r mod n
= mdred/r mod n
= md mod n (4.5)
So the Requester ﬁnds the actual signature of m as (m, s) which satisﬁes the
Eqn. (4.5). Figure 4.1 depicts the Chaum’s BSS in terms of message communi-
cated between the Requester and the Signer.
The most important thing to observe about this protocol is that Signer has
issued the signature without ever seeing the actual message. This happens because
the blinding factor re was multiplied to the message, and as a result the ﬁnal
message just looked like a random element of Zn to Signer. Later, after the
signature is issued, and Requester divides out by r (to remove the blinding factor),
the resulting message-signature pair is unrecognizable to Signer. In fact, if Signer
later sees this message, she can easily verify that the signature is indeed hers, but
she will be critically limited in accurately determining when for whom she signed
the message. At best, she may be able to make a random guess from among the
signatures she has issued, but she cannot do any better.
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Figure 4.1: Chaum’ s Blind Signature Scheme based on RSA
4.2 Applications of BSS
In this section, applications of BSS in digital cash and online voting have been
discussed.
4.2.1 Digital Cash
We now outline how to apply the blind digital signature idea to digital cash [119].
We give a basic protocol due to Chaum [55] for a digital cash transaction. We
describe a very simple version of the protocol primarily to give the main ideas. As
a result, there are some minor ﬂaws in it, but standard techniques exist to amend
these ﬂaws. There are several more comprehensive works on electronic cash which
discuss this, as well as other well-known ECS [120,121]. In the protocol we present,
we assume that there is a student who wants to buy a Book, which costs INR 250
from the ﬁctitious online vendor e-Bay. Furthermore, Student and e-Bay both use
the same bank, which we call the Bank. The entire transaction protocol is broken
up into three stages— Withdrawal, Spending, and Deposit.
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Withdrawal
1. Student creates a piece of digital currency C. This currency consists of a
string of bits which specify certain information such as a large random serial
number and the rupees amount (which is INR 250 in this case).
2. Student now takes C, and gets the Bank to blindly sign it, i.e., Student and
the Bank engage in a blind signature protocol, at the end of which Student
possesses a valid signature on the currency.
3. Upon successful completion of the protocol, the Bank deducts INR 250 from
Student’s Bank account.
Spending
1. Student requests a copy of the book he wants from e-Bay. Student takes
this valid INR 250, C, along with the bank’s signature on that Rupees, and
gives it to e-Bay.
2. e-Bay checks that C is valid by verifying the signature on it with the Bank’s
public key. If the signature is invalid, e-Bay immediately ends the protocol.
Deposit
1. e-Bay now takes the currency C, and the Bank’s signature on C, and gives
it to the Bank.
2. The Bank veriﬁes that the signature on the Rupees is indeed valid, i.e., the
currency was indeed signed by the Bank. If it is valid, the bank needs to
check that the coin has not yet been spent. If the signature on the coin is
valid and the currency has not yet been spent, then the Bank credits e-Bay’s
bank account by INR 250.
3. If all checks out, then e-Bay gives Student the book she requested.
Thus we have completed a transaction. Observe that Student’s identity re-
mains anonymous to both the Bank and to e-Bay. This happens because a blind
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signature was issued on the currency. Therefore, once Student has the signed cur-
rency, the vendor certainly will not be able to tell that Student is the owner of the
currency. Moreover, when the vendor gives the money to the Bank for deposit, the
Bank will not be able to link the currency it just received to Student, because it
blindly signed the message, and therefore, it had no idea what the contents were.
4.2.2 Online Voting
We give an application of the traditional blind signature protocol to electronic
voting. We now suppose that we have two entities— a voter Alice, and a Central
Tabulating Authority (CTA). We assume that the votes are of the form Yes or
No. The protocol we give is adapted from the one presented by Schneier [122].
The voting protocol is divided into two stages— registration and voting.
Registration
1. Alice creates two electronic ballots B1 and B2 which consist of a serial num-
ber, and some other relevant information for voting. In addition, B1 contains
the vote Yes and B2 contains the vote No.
2. Alice then takes the ballots B1, B2 and blinds them. It sends the blind
versions to the CTA.
3. The CTA checks its database to make sure that Alice has not voted before.
If this is the case, then it signs the blinded ballots and it gives them back to
Alice.
Voting
1. Alice unblinds the messages, and now has two sets of valid votes signed by
the CTA.
2. Alice picks one vote (Yes or No) she wants to choose, along with the CTA’s
signature on that vote, and encrypts it with the CTA’s public key.
3. Alice sends in her vote.
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4. The CTA decrypts the votes, checks that the signature is valid, and checks
its database to make sure that the serial number on the vote has not been
used before (this prevents Alice from trying to vote more than once). If this
checks out then the CTA tabulates the vote, saves the serial number and
records it in the database. At the end of the election, the CTA publishes
the results of the election, as well as every serial number and its associated
vote.
4.3 Proposed Blind Signature Schemes
In this section, before describing four proposed BSS and its application to oﬄine
digital cash, ﬁrst we will describe the variation of DSS based on ECC.
Initially, the curve parameters (p, a, b, G, n, h) must be agreed upon by Signer
and Receiver which is explained in Section 3.1.2. Signer must have a key pair
suitable for elliptic curve cryptography, consisting of a private key dB (randomly
selected in the interval [1, n− 1]) and a public key Q, where Q = dBG.
4.3.1 Digital Signature Schemes based on ECDLP
1. Based on Nyberg-Ruppel Scheme (BNRS)
When a Signer wants to send a signed message m to Receiver, he/she must generate
a digital signature (R, s) as follows:
Message m is converted into a point M on EC.
Select k ∈ [1, n− 1] and generate R, r and s as:
R = M + kG where, R = (xr, yr)
r = xr mod n
s = (rdB + k) mod n
After receiving (R, s) from Signer, the Receiver can verify the correctness of
the signature on the message by using following equation:
M = rQ + R − sG (4.6)
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Correctness
The veriﬁer can verify the pair (R, s) and message m by using the above equation.
The correctness of the equation is as follows:
s = (rdB + k) mod n
⇒ sG = rdBG + kG
⇒ sG = rQ + kG
⇒ sG = rQ + R−M
⇒M = rQ + R− sG
2. Based on Variation of DSA (BDSA1)
When a Signer wants to send a signed message m to Receiver, a digital signature
(R, s) is generated as follows:
Select k ∈ [1, n− 1] and generate R, r and s as:
R = kG where, R = (xr, yr)
r = xr mod n and r = 0 (4.7)
s = (km + rdB) mod n and s = 0 (4.8)
After receiving (R, s) from the Signer, the Receiver can verify the correctness
of the signature on the message by using following equation:
mR = sG− rQ (4.9)
Correctness
The veriﬁer can verify the pair (R, s) and message m by using the above equation.
Also the correctness of the equation is as follows:
s = (km + rdB) mod n
⇒ sG = kmG + rdBG
⇒ sG = Rm + rQ
⇒ mR = sG− rQ
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3. Based on Variation of DSA (BDSA2)
When a Signer wants to send a signed message m to Receiver, a digital signature
(R, s) is generated as follows:
Select k ∈ [1, n− 1] and generate R, r and s as:
R = kG where, R = (xr, yr)
r = xr mod n and r = 0 (4.10)
s = (mdB − rk) mod n and s = 0 (4.11)
After receiving (R, s) from the Signer, the Receiver can verify the correctness
of the signature on the message by using following equation:
mQ = sG + rR (4.12)
Correctness
The veriﬁer can verify the pair (R, s) and message m by using the above equation.
Also the correctness of the equation is as follows:
s = (mdB − rk) mod n
⇒ sG = mdBG− rkG
⇒ sG = mQ− rR
⇒ mQ = sG + rR
4. Based on Variation of DSA (BDSA3)
When a Signer wants to send a signed message m to Receiver, a digital signature
(R, s) is generated as follows:
Select k ∈ [1, n− 1] and generate R, r and s as:
R = kG where, R = (xr, yr)
r = xr mod n and r = 0 (4.13)
s = (mrdB − k) mod n and s = 0 (4.14)
After receiving (R, s) from the Signer, the Receiver can verify the correctness
of the signature on the message by using following equation:
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sG = mrQ−R (4.15)
Correctness
The veriﬁer can verify the pair (R, s) and message m by using the above equation.
Also the correctness of the equation is as follows:
s = (mrdB − k) mod n
⇒ sG = mrdBG− kG
⇒ sG = mrQ−R
4.3.2 Blind Signature Schemes based on ECDLP
In the proposed schemes, the Requester requests signature from the Signer, and
the Signer issues blind signature to the Requester without knowing the content of
the message. The protocol consists of following ﬁve phases:
(a) Initialization phase
(b) Blinding phase
(c) Signing phase
(d) Extraction phase
(e) Verifying phase
In the initialization phase, the system’s parameter is deﬁned, and the Signer pub-
lishes the necessary information and sends partially blind signature to Requester.
To obtain a signature, a Requester submits an encrypted version (blinds the mes-
sage) of the message to the Signer in the requesting phase. In the signing phase,
the Signer computes the blind signature of the message, and then sends the re-
sult back to the Requester. In the extraction phase, the Requester extracts the
signature from the blind signature he receives from the signer. Lastly, anyone can
verify the legitimacy of the digital signature in the verifying phase. The details of
proposed schemes are presented as follows.
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1. Based on BNRS (BSSNRS)
The Initialization Phase
The Signer randomly chooses k˜, and calculates r˜ as follows:
R˜ = k˜G
R˜ = (x˜r, y˜r)
r˜ = x˜r mod n and r˜ = 0
The Signer sends R˜ to Requester.
The Blinding Phase
After receiving R˜, Requester randomly selects integers α, β ∈ [1, n− 1] and com-
putes R as:
R = M + αG + βR˜
⇒ βR˜ + αG = R −M
r = xr mod n
(4.16)
After calculating r, the Requester blinds the message m as follows:
m˜ = rβ−1 mod n (4.17)
The Requester sends the blind messages m˜ to Signer for signature.
The Signing Phase
In this phase, the Signer computes blind signature s˜ by using received blind mes-
sage m˜ as follows:
s˜ = (m˜dB + k˜) mod n (4.18)
Then the Signer sends the blind signatures s˜ to the Requester.
The Extraction Phase
After receiving the blind signature s˜, the Requester extracts the actual signature
as follows:
s = (s˜β + α) mod n (4.19)
The pair (r, s) are the valid digital signature of message m.
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The Verifying Phase
The legitimacy of the digital signature (R, r, s) of message m is as follows:
M = rQ + R − sG (4.20)
The proposed scheme is diagrammatically shown in Fig. 4.2.
Figure 4.2: Proposed blind signature scheme: BNRS
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2. Based on BDSA1 (BSSDSA1)
The Initialization Phase
The Signer randomly chooses k˜, and calculates r˜ as follows:
R˜ = k˜G
R˜ = (x˜r, y˜r)
r˜ = x˜r mod n and r˜ = 0
The Signer sends R˜ to Requester.
The Blinding Phase
After receiving R˜, Requester randomly selects integers α, β and computes R as:
R = αR˜ + βG
r = xr mod n
(4.21)
After calculating r, the Requester blinds the message m as follows:
m˜ = αmr˜r−1 mod n (4.22)
The Requester sends the blind messages m˜ to Signer for signature.
The Signing Phase
In this phase, the Signer computes blind signature s˜ by using received blind mes-
sage m˜ as follows:
s˜ = (k˜m˜ + r˜dB) mod n (4.23)
Then the Signer sends the blind signatures s˜ to the Requester.
The Extraction Phase
After receiving the blind signature s˜, the Requester extracts the actual signature
as follows:
s = (s˜rr˜−1 + βm) mod n (4.24)
The pair (r, s) are the valid digital signature of message m.
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The Verifying Phase
The legitimacy of the digital signature (R, r, s) of message m is as follows:
mR = sG− rQ (4.25)
The proposed scheme is diagrammatically shown in Fig. 4.3.
Figure 4.3: Proposed blind signature scheme: BSSDSA1
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3. Based on BDSA2 (BSSDSA2)
The Initialization Phase
In the initialization phase the Signer randomly chooses k˜1, k˜2, l1 and l2, and cal-
culates r˜1 and r˜2 as follows:
R˜1 = k˜1G
R˜2 = k˜2G
(4.26)
where R˜1 = (x˜r1 , y˜r1) and R˜2 = (x˜r2 , y˜r2)
r˜1 = x˜r1 mod n and r˜1 = 0
r˜2 = x˜r2 mod n and r˜2 = 0
(4.27)
The Signer sends (R˜1, R˜2, l1, l2) to Requester.
The Blinding Phase
After receiving (R˜1, R˜2, l1, l2), the Requester should request for signature by com-
puting the values as follows. The Requester randomly selects four integers α, β, γ,
and η such that α is relatively prime to β, i.e., GCD(α, β) = 1. According to
Extended Eculid’s algorithm there exist two integers i and j such that (iγ +
jη) mod n = 1. The Signer’s secret values are (α, β, γ, η, i, j). The Requester
computes R1 and R2 as follows:
R1 = γαl1R˜1 where, R1 = (xr1, yr1)
R2 = ηβl2R˜2 where, R2 = (xr2 , yr2)
r1 = xr1 mod n
r2 = xr2 mod n
r = (r1 ∗ r2) mod n
R = R1 + R2
(4.28)
After calculating r1 and r2, the Requester blinds the message m as follows:
m˜1 = imr˜1r
−1
1 r
−1
2 α
−1 mod n
m˜2 = jmr˜2r
−1
1 r
−1
2 β
−1 mod n
(4.29)
The Requester sends the blind messages m˜1 and m˜2 to Signer for signature.
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The Signing Phase
In this phase, the Signer computes blind signatures s˜1 and s˜2 by using received
blind messages m˜1 and m˜2 as follows:
s˜1 = (dBm˜1 − r˜1k˜1l1) mod n
s˜2 = (dBm˜2 − r˜2k˜2l2) mod n
(4.30)
Then the Signer sends the blind signatures s˜1 and s˜2 to the Requester.
The Extraction Phase
Requester should do the followings to recover the real signature s after receiving
the blinded signatures s˜1 and s˜2 from the Signer.
s1 = s˜1r˜
−1
1 r1r2γα mod n
s2 = s˜2r˜
−1
2 r1r2ηβ mod n
s = (s1 + s2) mod n
(4.31)
R = R1 + R2
r = (r1.r2) mod n
(4.32)
The pair (r, s) is the valid digital signature of message m.
The Verifying Phase
The legitimacy of the digital signature (R, r, s) of message m is as follows:
mQ = sG + rR (4.33)
The proposed scheme is diagrammatically shown in Fig. 4.4 .
4. Based on BDSA3 (BSSDSA3)
The Initialization Phase
In the initialization phase the Signer randomly chooses k˜1, k˜2, l1 and l2, and cal-
culates r˜1 and r˜2 as follows:
R˜1 = k˜1G
R˜2 = k˜2G
(4.34)
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Figure 4.4: Proposed blind signature scheme: BSSDSA2
where R˜1 = (x˜r1 , y˜r1) and R˜2 = (x˜r2 , y˜r2)
r˜1 = x˜r1 mod n and r˜1 = 0
r˜2 = x˜r2 mod n and r˜2 = 0
(4.35)
The Signer sends (R˜1, R˜2, l1, l2) to Requester.
The Blinding Phase
After receiving (R˜1, R˜2, l1, l2), the Requester should request for signature by com-
puting the values as follows. The Requester randomly selects four integers α, β, γ,
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and η such that α is relatively prime to β, i.e., GCD(α, β) = 1. According to
Extended Eculid’s algorithm there exist two integers i and j such that (iγ +
jη) mod n = 1. The Signer’s secret values are (α, β, γ, η, i, j). The Requester
computes R1 and R2 as follows:
R1 = γαl1R˜1 where, R1 = (xr1, yr1)
R2 = ηβl2R˜2 where, R2 = (xr2 , yr2)
r1 = xr1 mod n
r2 = xr2 mod n
r = (r1 ∗ r2) mod n
R = R1 + R2
(4.36)
After calculating r1 and r2, the Requester blinds the message m as follows:
m˜1 = imr˜
−1
1 r1r2α
−1 mod n
m˜2 = jmr˜
−1
2 r1r2β
−1 mod n
(4.37)
The Requester sends the blind messages m˜1 and m˜2 to Signer for signature.
The Signing Phase
In this phase, the Signer computes blind signatures s˜1 and s˜2 by using received
blind messages m˜1 and m˜2 as follows:
s˜1 = (dBm˜1r˜1 − k˜1l1) mod n
s˜2 = (dBm˜2r˜2 − k˜2l2) mod n
(4.38)
Then the Signer sends the blind signatures s˜1 and s˜2 to the Requester.
The Extraction Phase
Requester should do the followings to recover the real signature s after receiving
the blinded signatures s˜1 and s˜2 from the Signer.
s1 = s˜1γα mod n
s2 = s˜2ηβ mod n
s = (s1 + s2) mod n
(4.39)
R = R1 + R2
r = (r1.r2) mod n
(4.40)
The pair (r, s) is the valid digital signature of message m.
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The Verifying Phase
The legitimacy of the digital signature (R, r, s) of message m is as follows:
mrQ = R + sG (4.41)
The proposed scheme is diagrammatically shown in Fig. 4.5.
Figure 4.5: Proposed blind signature scheme: BSSDSA3
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4.4 Poof of Properties of the Proposed Blind
Signature Schemes
In this section, we discuss the correctness, blindness, untraceability, and unforge-
ability and some of the important properties of our proposed blind signature
schemes.
4.4.1 Correctness
This section proves the correctness of the equations for verifying phases of four
proposed BSS.
1. BSSNRS
The veriﬁer has only digital signature (r, s, R) of message m for veriﬁcation.
s = (s˜β + α) mod n
= ((m˜dB + k)β + α) mod n
= ((rβ−1dB + k)β + α) mod n
= (rdB + kβ + α) mod n
(4.42)
Now multiplying both sides of (4.42) by generator G, we have
sG = rdBG + kβG + αG
⇒ sG = rQ + R˜β + αG
⇒ sG = rQ + R−M
⇒M = rQ + R − sG
2. BSSDSA1
The correctness of this scheme can be easily veriﬁed as follows. The veriﬁer has
only digital signature (r, s, R) of message m for veriﬁcation.
s = (s˜rr˜−1 + βm) mod n
= ((km˜ + r˜dB)rr˜−1 + βm) mod n
= (km˜rr˜−1 + r˜dBrr˜−1 + βm) mod n
= (kαmr˜r−1rr˜−1 + dBr + βm) mod n
= (kαm + dBr + βm) mod n
(4.43)
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Now multiplying both sides of (4.43) by generator G, we have
sG = kαmG + dBrG + βmG
⇒ sG = R˜αm + rQ + βmG
⇒ sG = m(R˜α + βmG) + rQ
⇒ sG = mR + rQ
⇒ mR = sG− rQ
3. BSSDSA2
The correctness of this scheme can be easily veriﬁed as follows. The veriﬁer has
only digital signature (r, s, R) of message m for veriﬁcation.
s = (s1 + s2) mod n
= (s˜1r˜
−1
1 r1r2γα + s˜2r˜
−1
2 r1r2ηβ) mod n
= ((dBm˜1 − r˜1k1l1)r˜−11 r1r2γα + (dBm˜2 − r˜2k2l2)r˜−12 r1r2ηβ) mod n
= ((dBimr˜1r
−1
1 r
−1
2 α
−1 − r˜1k1l1)r˜−11 r1r2γα+
(dBjmr˜2r
−1
1 r
−1
2 β
−1 − r˜2k2l2)r˜−12 r1r2ηβ) mod n
= (dBimγ − k1l1r1r2γα + dBjmη − k2l2r1r2ηβ) mod n
= (dBm(iγ + jη)− r1r2(k1l1γα + k2l2ηβ)) mod n
= (dBm− r(k1l1γα + k2l2ηβ)) mod n
(4.44)
Now multiplying both sides of (4.44) by generator G, we have
sG = (dBm− r(k1l1γα + k2l2ηβ))G
⇒ sG = dBmG− r(k1l1γαG+ k2l2ηβG)
⇒ sG = Qm− r(R˜1l1γα + R˜2l2ηβ)
⇒ sG = Qm− r(R1 + R2)
⇒ sG = Qm− rR
⇒ rR = sG + Qm
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4. BSSDSA3
The correctness of this scheme can be easily veriﬁed as follows. The veriﬁer has
only digital signature (r, s, R) of message m for veriﬁcation.
s = (s1 + s2) mod n
= (s˜1γα + s˜2ηβ) mod n
= ((dBm˜1r˜1 − k1l1)γα + (dBm˜2r˜2 − k2l2)ηβ) mod n
= ((dBimr˜
−1
1 r1r2α
−1r˜1 − k1l1)γα + (dBjmr˜−11 r1r2β−1r˜2 − k2l2)ηβ) mod n
= ((dBimr1r2α
−1 − k1l1)γα + (dBjmr1r2β−1 − k2l2)ηβ) mod n
= ((dBimrα
−1 − k1l1)γα + (dBjmrβ−1 − k2l2)ηβ) mod n
= (dBimrα
−1γα− k1l1γα + dBjmrβ−1ηβ − k2l2ηβ) mod n
= (dBimrγ − k1l1γα + dBjmrη − k2l2ηβ) mod n
= (dBmr(iγ + jη)− (k1l1γα + k2l2ηβ)) mod n
= (dBmr − (k1l1γα + k2l2ηβ)) mod n
(4.45)
Now multiplying both sides of (4.45) by generator G, we have
sG = (dBmr − (k1l1γα + k2l2ηβ))G
⇒ sG = dBmrG− (k1l1γα + k2l2ηβ)G
⇒ sG = Qmr − (k1l1γαG + k2l2ηβG)
⇒ sG = Qmr − (R˜1l1γα + R˜2l2ηβ)
⇒ sG = Qmr − (R1 + R2)
⇒ sG = Qmr −R
⇒ mrQ = sG + R
4.4.2 Blindness
This is the one of the important property of the BSS. Because of this property, the
Signer signs the document without knowing the contents of the document. In case
of David Chaum’s scheme, this property is achieved because of the multiplication
of the blinding factor r with the message m, i.e., blind message m˜ = rem mod n,
where e is the public key of the Signer. Thus, Signer cannot ﬁnd the original mes-
sage from the blind message. Similarly, our protocols have achieved this property
as follows.
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1. BSSNRS
The Requester selects two random numbers α, β and blinds the original message
by m˜ = rβ−1 mod n. The Requester sends the blind message to Signer. As α and
β are known to only Requester, hence it is not possible for the Signer to ﬁnd the
message m from the blind message m˜.
2. BSSDSA1
The Requester selects two random numbers α, β and blinds the original message
by m˜ = αmr˜r−1 mod n. The Requester sends the blind message to Signer. As α
and β are known to only Requester, hence it is not possible for the Signer to ﬁnd
the message m from the blind message m˜.
3. BSSDSA2
The Requester selects four random numbers α, β, γ, η and blinds the original mes-
sage by m˜1 = imr˜1r
−1
1 r
−1
2 α
−1 mod n and m˜2 = jmr˜2r−11 r
−1
2 β
−1 mod n. The Re-
quester sends the blind messages m˜1 and m˜2 to Signer. As α, β, γ, and η are known
to only Requester, hence it is not possible for the Signer to ﬁnd the message m
from the blind messages m˜1 and m˜2.
4. BSSDSA3
The Requester selects four random numbers α, β, γ, η and blinds the original mes-
sage by m˜1 = imr˜
−1
1 r1r2α
−1 mod n and m˜2 = jmr˜−12 r1r2β
−1 mod n. The Re-
quester sends the blind messages age m from the blind messages to Signer. As
α, β, γ, and η are known to only Requester, hence it is not possible for the Signer
to ﬁnd the message m from the blind messages m˜1 and m˜2.
4.4.3 Untraceability
As per this property, the Signer cannot link a valid signature to the message. The
proposed protocols have achieved this property as follows.
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1. BSSNRS
The Signer stores the information about all the signatures which are signed by him
as (m˜i, k˜i, R˜i, s˜i), where i = 1, ..., n. When Requester reveals all n valid signatures
(m,R, s) to others, the Signer can evaluate rβ−1 (m˜ = rβ−1 mod n). But, the
Signer cannot trace the blind signature to the message without knowing the α
and β.
2. BSSDSA1
The Signer stores the information about all the signatures which are signed by him
as (m˜i, k˜i, R˜i, s˜i), where i = 1, ..., n. When Requester reveals all n valid signatures
(m,R, s) to others, the Signer can evaluate αr−1 (m˜ = αmr˜r−1 mod n). But, the
Signer cannot trace the blind signature to the message without knowing the α and
β.
3. BSSDSA2
The Signer stores the information about all the signatures which are signed by him
as (m˜i, k˜i, R˜i, s˜i), where i = 1, ..., n. When Requester reveals all n valid signatures
(m,R, s) to others, the Signer can evaluate iα−1 (m˜1 = imr˜1r−11 r
−1
2 α
−1 mod n)
and jβ−1 (m˜2 = jmr˜2r−11 r
−1
2 β
−1 mod n). But the Signer cannot trace the blind
signature to the message without knowing the α, β, γ, and η.
4. BSSDSA3
The Signer stores the information about all the signatures which are signed by him
as (m˜i, k˜i, R˜i, s˜i), where i = 1, ..., n. When Requester reveals all n valid signatures
(m,R, s) to others, the Signer can evaluate iα−1 (m˜1 = imr˜−11 r1r2α
−1 mod n)
and jβ−1 (m˜2 = jmr˜−12 r1r2β
−1 mod n). But, the Signer cannot trace the blind
signature to the message without knowing the α, β, γ, and η.
4.4.4 Unforgeability
BSS are mainly based on IFP, DLP or ECDLP. As per the research, there is no
known sub-exponential algorithm which can solve the ECDLP. Hence, the BSS
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based on ECDLP are more secure to their counterparts which are developed using
IFP or DLP.
1. BSSNRS
As per ECDLP, it is computational infeasible to ﬁnd the secrete key dB from
Q = dBG. From the veriﬁcation equation M = rQ + R − sG, an attacker can
choose randomly another R or s and try to ﬁnd s or R, but as it is based on the
diﬃculty of ECDLP, hence it is not possible to ﬁnd another set of R and s form
the veriﬁcation equation as mentioned above.
2. BSSDSA1
As per ECDLP, it is computational infeasible to ﬁnd the secrete key dB from
Q = dBG. From the veriﬁcation equation mR = sG− rQ, an attacker can choose
randomly another R or s and try to ﬁnd s or R, but as it is based on the diﬃculty of
ECDLP, hence it is not possible to ﬁnd another set of R and s form the veriﬁcation
equation as mentioned above.
3. BSSDSA2
As per ECDLP, it is computational infeasible to ﬁnd the secrete key dB from
Q = dBG. From the veriﬁcation equation mQ = sG+ rR, an attacker can choose
randomly another R or s and try to ﬁnd s or R, but as it is based on the diﬃculty of
ECDLP, hence it is not possible to ﬁnd another set of R and s form the veriﬁcation
equation as mentioned above.
4. BSSDSA3
As per ECDLP, it is computational infeasible to ﬁnd the secrete key dB from
Q = dBG. From the veriﬁcation equation mrQ = R+ sG, an attacker can choose
randomly another R or s and try to ﬁnd s or R, but as it is based on the diﬃculty of
ECDLP, hence it is not possible to ﬁnd another set of R and s form the veriﬁcation
equation as mentioned above.
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4.5 Results and Discussion
The proposed schemes have been proved to be correct. They also satisfy the prop-
erties of BSS, i.e, blindness, untraceability and unforgeability. All the schemes
have been implemented using Java Card Toolkit 2-1-2 and tested in Java Card
simulator— jcwde (Java Card Workstation Development Environment). The pro-
posed schemes are compared with the known BSS which are given in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Comparative statement among blind signature schemes
Scheme Basis 80-Bit Security Strength
Chaum [55] IFP 1024-bit modulus
Cao and Liu [123] IFP 1024-bit modulus
Camenisch et al. (Version 1) [84] DLP |p| = 1024, |q| = 160
Camenisch et al. (Version 2) [84] DLP |p| = 1024, |q| = 160
Proposed schemes ECDLP m = 163 bits
As per NIST [124], ECDLP-based BSS takes 160 bits for 80-bit security strength,
which is comparable to proposed scheme. Lourdes et al. [125] has implemented
our proposed scheme and they also found that it takes 163 bits.
With respect to the computational time, the proposed schemes are compared
with the known BSS which are given in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Time Comparison among blind signature schemes for 80-bit security
strength
Scheme Time in μs
Chaum [55] 7058.59
Cao and Liu [123] 8002.65
Camenisch et al. (Version 1) [84] 3352.38
Camenisch et al. (Version 2) [84] 2803.15
Proposed schemes 1356.45
It can be seen from the Table 4.2 that the proposed scheme takes much less
computational time than the known BSS. Computational cost of proposed scheme
is almost one-third of that of DLP-based BSS and one-sixth of IFP-based BSS.
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Remote User Authentication
Protocol using Smart Card
The use of information technology and Internet has grown in exponential way. Due
to this, service providers share their services through networks. As the resources
are not free for all, access control is necessary. So, authentication is the key for
information security since, if the authentication mechanism is compromised, the
rest of the security measures are bypassed as well. Authentication is the process,
in which a user’s claim to an identity is checked for accessing the services oﬀered.
Conventional user authentication schemes are suited to solve the privacy and secu-
rity problems for the single client/server architecture environment. Remote user
authentication is used to validate the legitimacy of a remote login user.
Password-based remote user authentication schemes are used to check the va-
lidity of a login request made by a remote user U to before allowing him/her to
access the server resources. In these schemes, the authentication server (AS) and
the remote user U share a secret, which is often called as password. With the
knowledge of this password, the remote user U uses it to create a valid login re-
quest to the AS. AS requires a veriﬁcation table, which contains the passwords
of various users, to check the validity of the login request made by the user U .
However, this approach introduces the risk and cost of managing and protecting
the password table. If the password veriﬁcation table is stolen by the adversary,
the system will be partially or totally breached.
To overcome this problem, several password authentication schemes with smart
card have been proposed. Remote user authentication schemes can be categorized
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into hash based, public-key based etc. In this chapter, schemes from each group
have been discussed in brief and the proposed scheme is explained.
5.1 Schemes based on Hash Function
Lamport’s (LL) [93] and Cheng-Chi Lee et al. (LLH) [99] schemes are explained
below.
5.1.1 LL Scheme
In 1981, Lamport introduced the ﬁrst hash-based password authentication scheme.
According to him, an intruder could learn the user secret password and then
impersonate him when interacting with the system because of the following reasons
• By gaining access to the information stored inside the system, e.g., reading
the system’s password ﬁle.
• By intercepting the user’s communication with the system, e.g., eavesdrop-
ping on the line connecting the user’s terminal with the system, or observing
the execution of the password checking program.
• By the user’s inadvertent disclosure of his password, e.g., choosing an easily
guessed password.
To overcome these diﬃculties, he suggested the ﬁrst user authentication scheme
using a veriﬁer table. The scheme is explained below:
He has used a one-way function to encode the password table, by which the ﬁrst
diﬃculty can be handled. A one-way function is a mapping F from some set of
words into itself such that:
1. Given a word x, it is easy to compute F (x).
2. Given a word y, it is not feasible to compute a word x such that y = F (x).
Instead of storing the user’s password x, the system stores only the value
y = F (x). The user identiﬁes himself by sending x to the system; the system
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authenticates his identity by computing F (x) and checking that it equals the
stored value y.
To prevent the second weakness, user must use a sequence of passwords x1, x2,
..., x1000, where xi is the password by which the user identiﬁes himself for the
ith time. The system must know the sequence y1, y2, ..., y1000 where, yi = F (xi),
and the yi must be distinct to prevent an intruder from reusing a prior password.
There are two obvious schemes for choosing the passwords xi.
1. All xi are chosen initially, and the system maintains the entire sequence of
values y1, y2, ..., y1000 in its storage.
2. The user sends the value yi+1 to the system during the i
th session, after
logging on with xi.
Neither scheme is completely satisfactory, because
1. both the user and the system must store 1000 pieces of information
2. it is not robust— communication failure or interference from an intruder
could prevent the system from learning the correct value of yi+1.
Lamport presents a method that combines the best features of both schemes
without these drawbacks. As per him, let the ith password xi = F
1000−i(x) for
some ﬁxed word x, where F n denotes n successive applications of F . Thus, the
sequence of 1000 passwords is
F 999(x), ..., F (F (F (x))), F (F (x)), F (x), x
The sequence of yi needed by the system to authenticate these passwords is
F 1000(x), ..., F (F (F (x))), F (F (x)), F (x)
Since it is feasible to compute F n for n < 1000, property of the one-way function
implies that these yi are distinct. It follows from deﬁnition of the xi that yi = xi−1
for i > 1. In other words, each user password is the value needed by the system
to authenticate the next password. Hence, the system must initially be given the
value y1 = F
1000(x) and need subsequently remember only the last password sent
by the user.
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5.1.2 LLH Scheme
The scheme is based on the hash functions. There are three phases in the scheme—
registration, user authentication, and change password phases.
The Registration Phase
In the registration phase, each user Ui must randomly choose identity IDi and
password PWi, and then calculate a password digest HPWi = H(IDi, PWi),
where H() is a collision resistant hash function, such as SHA-1. Ui sends IDi and
HPWi to a server. The server stores IDi and HPWi in veriﬁcation table.
The Authentication Phase
1. The user Ui enters his/her identity IDi and password PWi to the client. The
client calculates HPWi = H(IDi, PWi), where H() is a hash function with
output message in 512 bits length. The client randomly chooses a number
Rc with 512 bits length and sends IDi and Rc ⊕HPWi to the server.
2. After receiving IDi and Rc⊕HPWi, the server retrieves the user’s password
digest HPWi from the veriﬁcation table and then obtains Rc by comput-
ing (Rc ⊕ HPWi) ⊕ HPWi. Next, the server randomly generates a num-
ber Rs with 512 bits length and calculates Rs ⊕ HPWi and AUTH ′ =
H(HPWi, Rc, Rs). The server sends Rs ⊕HPWi to the client.
3. After receiving Rs ⊕ HPWi, the client retrieves Rs by computing (Rs ⊕
HPWi)⊕HPWi. Next, the client calculates
AUTH = H(HPWi, Rc, Rs) (5.1)
The client sends IDi and AUTH to the server.
4. After receiving IDi and AUTH , the server compares AUTH with AUTH
′.
If it is equal, the server accepts the accessing resources request. Otherwise,
it rejects the client’s request.
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The Change Password Phase
Steps 1 and 2 are the same as that of the user authentication phase. It is assumed
that Ui wants to change his/her password PWi to NewPWi.
3. After receiving Rs ⊕ HPWi, the client retrieves Rs by computing (Rs ⊕
HPWi)⊕HPWi. Next, the client calculates
NewHPWi = H(IDi, NewPWi) (5.2)
AUTH = H(HPWi, Rc, Rs) (5.3)
Mask = NewHPWi ⊕H(HPWi, Rc + 1, Rs) (5.4)
The client sends IDi, AUTH , and Mask to the server.
4. After receiving IDi, AUTH , and Mask, the server retrieves the user’s HPWi
from the veriﬁcation table, and then compares AUTH with AUTH ′. If it is
equal, the server accepts the client to change the user’s password and obtains
new password digest NewHPWi as follows:
NewHPWi = Mask ⊕H(HPWi, Rc + 1, Rs) (5.5)
Then the server replaces the old HPWi with the new password digest NewHPWi
in veriﬁcation table.
The above schemes are hash-based remote user authentication. These schemes
take low computation cost and are computationally viable for implementation in a
handheld device like smart card. However, the schemes primarily suﬀer from pass-
word guessing, stolen-veriﬁer and denial-of-service attacks. For this, public-key
based authentication schemes are proposed which meet higher security require-
ments. We will discuss two scheme based on public-key in brief.
5.2 Schemes based on Public Key Cryptosystem
Wen-Her Yang et al. (YS) [102] and Hwang et. al (ML) [105] schemes are explained
below.
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5.2.1 YS Scheme
In this scheme, Wen-Her Yang et al. assume that there exists a trusted key
information center in the network to issue personalized smart cards to users when
joining the system. Their scheme is divided into three phases. In the registration
phase, the key information center sets up the authentication system and issues
smart cards to the users who requests registration. In the login phase, a user
attaches his smart card to a terminal and keys in his identiﬁer ID and password
PW . Then the terminal sends a login request message to the remote host. In the
veriﬁcation phase, the remote host veriﬁes the correctness of submitted message
and determines whether the login request should be accepted or not.
Registration Phase
The key information center is not responsible for authenticating users, but for
generating key information, issuing smart cards to new users and serving password-
changing request for registered users. Let Ui denote the i
th user who submits his
identiﬁer IDi; and chosen password PWi, to the key information center to request
for registration. Here, PWi must be sent over a secure channel. Upon receipt of
the request, the key information center will perform the following steps:
1. Generate two large prime numbers p and q, and let n = pq. For security
reasons, the length of p and q is recommended to be 512 bits at least.
2. Choose a prime number e and an integer d which satisfy
e.d(mod(p− 1).(q − 1)) = 1. (5.6)
Here, e is the public key of the key information center that should be pub-
lished, and d is the secret key that must be kept privately.
3. Find an integer g which is a primitive element in both GF (p) and GF (q),
where g is the system’s public information.
4. Calculate the user’s secret information Si as
Si ≡ IDdi mod n. (5.7)
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According to the RSA algorithm , the following equation would be obtained.
IDi ≡ Sei mod n (5.8)
Even if one knows IDi, e, and n, it is hard to crack Si without the knowledge
of d. This is a discrete logarithm problem. The integer d can be evaluated
only when n is factorized to p and q, which is very diﬃcult because the
length of n is 1024 bits.
5. Generate the smart card’s identiﬁer CIDi, of Ui and compute hi by
hi = g
PWid mod n (5.9)
Here CIDi is used for validating the legality of smart cards in the veriﬁcation
phase.
6. Write n, e, g, IDi, CIDi, Si, and hi to the memory of smart card and issue
the card to Ui.
Once the authentication system is set up, the key information center is not needed
except when new users request to join, or registered users request to change pass-
words. When a new user requests to join, the center repeats step 4 through 6.
Login Phase
When Ui wishes to login a remote host, he must insert the smart card into a card
reader and enter his identity IDi
′ and password PWi′. If IDi′ is identical to the
IDi which is kept in the memory of the smart card, then smart card performs the
following steps:
1. Generate a random number ri and calculate the following two integers:
Xi = g
riPWi mod n
Yi = Sih
ri.f(CIDi,T )
i mod n
where T is the current time used as a time-stamp and f(x, y) is a one-way
function. The one-way function is a function relatively easy to compute but
signiﬁcantly harder to undo or reverse.
2. Send a login request message M containing IDi, CIDi, Xi, Yi, n, e, g and T
to the remote host.
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Veriﬁcation Phase
The veriﬁcation phase is executed by the remote host to determine whether Ui
is allowed to login or not. Let T ′ be the time when the remote host receives
the message M . Upon receipt of message M , the remote host will perform the
following steps to verify the correctness of M .
1. Verify that IDi is a valid user identity and CIDi is a legal smart card
identity. If not, the login request is rejected.
2. Compare T with T ′. If the diﬀerence between T and T ′ is longer than the
valid period, M is considered as an invalid message and the host computer
will reject the login request. According to diﬀerent network environments,
the length of the valid period can be adjusted.
3. It checks whether the following equation holds:
Y ei = IDiX
f(CIDI ,T )
i
The equation will hold when the password PW ′i , keyed in by Ui, matches
PWi registered in the key information center. That is because:
Y ei = (Sih
rif(CIDi,T )
i )
e
= Sei (h
rif(CIDi,T )
i )
e
= Sei (g
PWid)rif(CIDi,T )e
= IDi(g
ed)riPWif(CIDi,T )
= IDig
riPWif(CIDi,T )
Therefore,
IDiX
f(CIDi,T )
i = IDig
riPWif(CIDi,T )
4. If the equation holds, the remote host believes that the message M is sent
by Ui, and the password PW
′
i matches PWi. Therefore, Ui, is allowed to
login the remote host, otherwise the login request is rejected.
5.2.2 HL Scheme
The user authentication scheme is based on ElGamal’s public key cryptosystem
which uses smart card. The scheme is divided into three phases— registration,
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login and authentication phase. In the registration phase, the user U sends a
request to the AS for registration. The AS issues a smart card and a password
to every legal user through a secure channel. In the login phase, when the user
U wants to access the AS, she/he inserts her/his smart card to the smart card
reader and then keys the identity and the password to access services. In the
authentication phase, the AS checks the validity of the login request.
Registration Phase
A user U submits her/his ID to the AS. AS computes the password PW for the
user U as
PW = IDxs mod p
where, xs is a secret key maintained by the AS and p is a large prime number.
AS provides a password PW and a smart card to the user U through a secure
channel. The smart card contains the public parameters (f, p), where f is a one-
way function.
Login Phase
User U attaches her/his smart card to the smart card reader and keys ID and
PW . The smart card performs the following operation:
1. Generate a random number r.
2. Compute C1 = ID
r mod p
3. Compute t = f(T ⊕ PW ) mod p− 1, where T is the current date and time
of the smart card reader.
4. Compute M = IDt mod p.
5. Compute C2 = M(PW )
r mod p.
6. Sends a login request C = (ID,C1, C2, T ) to AS.
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Authentication Phase
Assume that AS receives the message C at time Tc, where Tc is the current date
and time at AS. Then the AS takes the following action:
1. Check the format of ID. If the identity format is not correct, then AS will
reject this login request.
2. Check, whether Tc − T ≤ ΔT , where ΔT is the legal time interval due to
transmission delay; if not, then rejects the login request C.
3. Check, if C2(C
xs
1 )
−1 = (ID)f(T⊕PW ) mod p, then the AS accepts the login
request; otherwise, the login request will be rejected.
5.3 Proposed Protocols
EC cryptosystems gives more security with less bit size key and computationally
faster than other cryptosystems. Because of these reasons, remote user authentica-
tion schemes have been proposed which are based on ECDLP and thus, can easily
be implemented in smart card. Before describing the schemes, we will discuss the
ECC based on ElGamal, then we will discuss the proposed schemes. The ﬁrst
scheme is based on HL scheme. The scheme is divided into three phases— reg-
istration, login and authentication phase. Beside these phases, password change
phase is used to enable the user to change his password as per his requirement
with out help of remote system.
Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem based on Elgamal
Suppose Alice wishes to send a message M to Bob. First, she imbeds the value M
onto the elliptic curve E , i.e., she represents the plaintext M as a point Pm ∈ E.
Now she must encrypt Pm. Let dB denote Bob’s secret key. Alice ﬁrst chooses a
random integer k and sends Bob a pair of points (C1, C2) on E:
C1 = kG
C2 = Pm + kQ
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To decrypt the cipher text, Bob computes
C2 − dBC1
⇒ Pm + kQ− dB(kG)
⇒ Pm + kQ− k(dBG)
⇒ Pm + kQ− kQ
⇒ Pm
5.3.1 User Authentication Protocol 1 (UAP1)
The notations used in UAP1 are given below:
U Remote user
ID Identity of the remote user
PW Password corresponding to the registered identity
AS Authentication Server
f() Cryptographic one-way hash function
Registration Phase
Initially, the curve domain parameters (p, a, b, G, n, h) as mentioned in Chapter 3
must be agreed upon by both the U and the AS. The user U converts his identity
and chosen password to point in Elliptic curve as ID and submits to the system.
This secret information must be sent over a secure channel. Upon receiving the
registration request, AS calculates the password PW as follows.
PW = dsID
where, ds is a secret key maintained by AS.
The registration centre issues a smart card which contains the public parameter
(f, n,G,Q), where f is a one-way function and Q is the public key of AS, i.e.,
Q = dsG. The registration centre also delivers PW to the user through a secure
channel. The smart cards possessed by all users will contain the same data and
functions, i.e., (f, n,G,Q).
Login Phase
Upon login, U attaches smart card to his/her input device. Then he enters her/his
ID and PW to the device. The smart card will perform the following operations:
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1. Select r randomly between [1, n− 1].
2. Compute C1 = rID.
3. Compute t = f(T ⊕ PW ) mod n, where T is the current date and time of
the input device.
4. Compute M = tID.
5. Compute C2 = M + rPW .
6. Send a message C consists of (ID,C1, C2, T ) to AS.
Authentication Phase
Upon receive of message C, AS authenticates the login user as follows :
1. Let AS receives the message C sent from U at T ′ , where T˜ is the current
date and time of the system.
2. Test the validity of ID. If the format of the ID is incorrect, then the AS
rejects the login user.
3. Test, whether T ′ − T ≤ ΔT , where ΔT is the legal time interval due to
transmission delay, if not, then rejects the login request C.
4. Check, if C2 − dsC1 = M , then AS accepts otherwise rejects the login user.
C2 − dsC1
= M + rPW − dsC1
= M + rPW − dsrID
= M + rdsID − dsrID
= M
The scheme is described in the Figure 5.1.
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Figure 5.1: User Authentication Protocol 1
Security analysis
As the proposed scheme is based on ECDLP, so it is not possible for attacker to
ﬁnd the secret key ds of AS from PW where PW = dsID. It is also diﬃcult for
the attacker to ﬁnd the randomly selected r from C1 = rID in the login phase.
For the attacker to pass through the step 2 of the authentication phase, he must
change T ′ into T ′′ such that (T ′′−T ′) ≤ ΔT . Once T is changed, the step 3 in the
authentication phase is failure unless either t or C2 has been changed accordingly.
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Therefore, the proposed scheme is secure to withstand the replay attack.
5.3.2 User Authentication Protocol 2 (UAP2)
The notations used in UAP2 are given below:
U Remote user
ID Identity of the remote user
PW Password corresponding to the registered identity
AS Authentication Server
f() Cryptographic one-way hash function
SID Shadow Identity
IS Identity string that includes name, unique number etc.
Registration Phase
Initially, the curve domain parameters (p, a, b, G, n, h) as mentioned in Chapter 3
must be agreed upon by both the U and AS. The scheme employs the concept of
hiding identity to prevent from masquerading attack. Assume that this phase is
executed over a secure channel. First, U submits her/his identity string IS, to the
AS for registration, where IS, is U ’s unique identity string that includes name,
unique number etc. The remote server computes (SID, PW ) for the registering
user after her/his identity IS, is identiﬁed as
SID = Sed(IS)
PW = dsSID
where, Sed() is a shadowed identity of the device which only is possessed with the
remote server; SID is U ’s shadowed identity which can be disclosed. Furthermore,
the remote server issues the smart card and (SID, PW ) to U . The registration
centre issues a smart card which contains the public parameter (f, n,G,Q), where
f is a one-way function and Q is the public key of AS, i.e., Q = dsG. The
registration centre also delivers PW to the user through a secure channel. The
smart cards possessed by all users will contain the same data and functions, i.e.,
(f, n,G,Q).
102
Chapter5 Remote User Authentication Protocol using Smart Card
Login Phase
Upon login, U attaches smart card to his/her input device. Then he enters her/his
SID and PW to the device. The smart card will perform the following operations:
1. Select r randomly between [1, n− 1].
2. Compute C1 = rSID.
3. Compute t = f(T ⊕ PW ) mod n, where T is the current date and time of
the input device.
4. Compute M = tID.
5. Compute C2 = M + rPW .
Send a message C consists of (SID,C1, C2, T ) to AS.
Authentication Phase
Upon receive of message C, AS authenticates the login user as follows:
1. Let AS receive the message C sent from U at T˜ , where T˜ is the current
date and time of the system.
2. Test the validity of ID . If the format of the ID is incorrect, then the AS
reject the login user.
3. Test, whether T˜ − T ≤ ΔT , where ΔT is the legal time interval due to
transmission delay, if not, then rejects the login request C.
4. If C2 − dsC1 = M , then the AS accept otherwise reject the login user.
C2 − dsC1
⇒M + rPW − dsC1
⇒M + rPW − dsrSID
⇒M + rdsSID − dsrSID
⇒M
The scheme is described in Figure 5.2.
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Figure 5.2: User Authentication Protocol 2
Security analysis
Assume that an evil user Um can intercepts C consists of (SID,C1, C2, T ) from
a public network. Now, Um submits her/his IS = kIS to AS to register for
masquerading as Ul. Upon receiving the registration message ISl, from Um, the
remote server will reject the registration request, because the format of ISl, is
incorrect which must include name, unique number etc. for identifying ISm, which
is maintained by the user Um, and AS secretly. Thus, Ul cannot masquerade as
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Um to login and access the remote server.
5.4 Result and Discussion
The correctness of the proposed algorithms are veriﬁed and security analysis has
been done in previous section. It has been shown that the proposed schemes with-
stand masquerade and replay attack. The proposed schemes are based on ECDLP.
Hence, they achieve the same security with fewer bits key as compared to IFP-
and DLP-based scheme. In addition, they have low computation requirements.
Thus, these are more suitable in the smart card based application. As we are us-
ing smart card for authentication, veriﬁer table is not required. Hence, it reduces
the maintenance cost of a veriﬁer table.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
Protocols like Key Management, Large Message Encryption, Digital and Blind
Signature, Oﬄine Signature and User Authentication Protocols are quite common
in ISS. For the last half a century, researchers across the globe have been working to
protect the information from attackers and quite signiﬁcant volumes of literature
are available in this regard. Some of the works are based on IFP and DLP, while
very little work has been done using ECDLP in case of Large Message Encryption,
Digital and Blind Signature and User Authentication Protocols. With regards to
Key Management lots of work have been done, but AS behaves as monitoring
server. In case of oﬄine signature veriﬁcation scheme, extensive work have been
done to detect random and simple forgeries, but very few research has been done
to verify the skilled forgery. Owing to this, these problems are still open and needs
substantial research.
In this thesis, attempts have been made to design protocols for ISS. Chapter
2 proposes a three party protocol which is secure against online and dictionary
attacks. It provides host and server authentication. As a result, man-in-the-middle
attack is averted. It also withstands malicious insider attack. Hosts are not forced
to store plaintext version of password at server. Due to this prevention mechanism,
online and oﬄine guessing attacks are defeated. Proposed protocol does not make
use of any public key infrastructure. Thus, it reduces the implementation cost.
ECDLP is used in Chapter 3 to encrypt large message. It has been shown
that the proposed protocols are computationally faster than the conventional El-
Gamal scheme. Thus these schemes can be used to encrypt the long message as
107
Conclusion and Future Work
compared to conventional encryption systems. As ECDLP is used for encryption,
hence the protocols require less computational power, memory and communication
bandwidth giving it clear edge over the traditional crypto-algorithm. It has been
proved that the proposed protocols are secure against the chosen-plain text attack.
It is also shown that the proposed protocols take considerably less computation
time than the ElGamal-like ECDLP cryptosystem.
Four proposed BSS based on ECDLP are presented in Chapter 4. These
schemes have shown that the properties of BSS which include correctness, blind-
ness, unforgebility and untraceable are achieved. As the schemes are based on
ECDLP, they achieve the same security with fewer bits key as compared to their
counterpart like IFP and DLP based schemes. In addition, they also require low-
computation time. The proposed schemes have been implemented and compared
with known BSS and it is found that the proposed schemes outperform others.
Two remote user authentication protocols—UAP1 and UAP2 using smart card
are presented in Chapter 5. As both the schemes are based on ECDLP, they
achieve the same security level with fewer bits key as compared to RSA and
ElGamal. The proposed schemes do not require veriﬁer table and allows the user
to choose their passwords. As the schemes are based on ECDLP, they require
less computation than their counterpart based on IFP or DLP. Because of these
properties, they can be easily implemented in applications where smart cards are
being used. They also withstand message replaying attack.
Scope for Further Research
The research ﬁndings made out of this thesis has opened several auxiliary research
directions, which can be further investigated. The proposed key management
scheme, which is used to share secret key between the sender and receiver and can
be extended to share secret key between group of users. Large message encryp-
tion protocol and BSS may be improved to be used in wireless sensor and adhoc
networks. Further scope is there to implement user authentication protocol using
hyper-elliptic cryptosystem.
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